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Abstract
The Impact of Bank Relationships on Corporate and Investment Decisions
by
Chih-Huei (Debby) Su
Adviser: Professor Linda Allen
This dissertation consists of three chapters addressing the impact of bank lending relation-
ships on three borrowing firms’ corporate and investment decisions: mergers and acquisitions,
board structure, and the timing of earnings announcements.
In the first chapter, I investigate the impact of prior bank lending relationships on bor-
rowing firms’ acquisition decisions. Information is particularly hard to obtain, but extremely
valuable in the course of major corporate events such as acquisitions. As informed lenders,
relationship banks are found to play a certification role in acquisitions. The greater the
intensity of a prior bank lending relationship, the greater the probability that a firm will ini-
tiate and complete acquisitions. Conditional on those completed acquisitions, prior lending
relationships are positively associated with the greater use of cash as a method of payment,
indicating that studies finding positive abnormal returns for cash-financed acquisitions may
contain bank certification effects. Furthermore, the market perceives the monitoring and
screening associated with more intense bank lending relationships as certification of value,
as evidenced by positive announcement effects, particularly for private target firms.
The second chapter studies the relation between bank lending relationships and borrow-
ing firms’ board structure. As delegated monitors, banks are granted various legal and con-
tractual powers to monitor and intervene in the borrowing firms’ daily operations, thereby
v
acting in conjunction with other corporate governance mechanisms. Bank monitoring is
costly, however, in terms of the cost of financing and potential hold-up problems. After
controlling for endogeneity, I find that the presence of lending relationships increases board
size and reduces the percentage of inside directors, resulting in a negative impact on the firm
value (Tobin’s Q). Controlling for the presence of a bank lending relationship may resolve an
ongoing debate regarding the role of inside directors in creating firm value. I also find the
costs outweigh the monitoring benefits and certification services provided by bank lenders.
In the third chapter, I examine the role of bank monitoring in the timing of earnings
announcements. Managers have been shown to procrastinate and delay the public release of
bad news on earnings. I find that banks discipline and prevent such managerial procrastina-
tion of earnings disclosures to the public. Moreover, I find that the market is more tolerant
of delays in the public release of earnings information in the presence of a bank lending
relationship. Thus, the negative abnormal return accompanying late releases of earnings
information is observed only when a bank lending relationship is not present.
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Chapter 1
The Impact of Bank Lending
Relationships on Mergers and
Acquisitions
1.1 Introduction
Banks have been viewed as both salubrious and nefarious participants in economic activ-
ities. As delegated monitors and private information producers, banks work closely with
their business clients to improve operations through access to credit implied by strong bank
lending relationships. These beneficial effects have long been recognized (see James (1987),
Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), and Berger and Udell (1995, 1996)). However, there is a
dark side to banking relationships. Banks can pursue their own interests at the expenses
of their clients, as shown in conflicts of interest such as the hold-up problem (see Sharpe
(1990) and Rajan (1992)). The question of whether the detriments dominate the benefits of
banking relationships is a subject for empirical inquiry. Indeed, the academic literature is
filled with contributions examining this question from points of view such as underwriting
1
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activity (see Puri (1996)), firm performance (see James (1987)), and loan contract terms (see
Bharath et al. (2011)).
However, an area that has been relatively neglected has been the impact of prior banking
relationships on the decision to acquire another firm. Acquisitions are probably one of most
important business activities in the arena of corporate finance. It would be expected that the
role of information providers such as lending banks would be most critical in these episodic,
information-intensive events. Although the literature has examined merger fee structure
(Saunders and Srinivasan (2001)), choice of adviser (Allen and Peristiani (2007) and others)
and acquisition outcome (Bruner (2002) and Dutta and Jog (2009)), there has been a paucity
of studies on the connection between banking relationships and the acquisition decision itself.
This paper addresses this gap by carefully examining the firm’s incentives to acquire as a
function of a prior banking relationship. The positive role that the relationship bank plays
in acquisitions can be found in its monitoring activities. Bank monitoring could prevent
value-reducing acquisitions motivated by entrenched management pursuing empire building
or self-serving risk diversification strategies. Further, banks provide sources of financing
to facilitate the acquisition and may enhance the integration of the acquired firm, thereby
improving the prospects for the merger. Monitoring and certification services inherent in
bank lending relationships could send positive signals of the acquisition’s prospects, which,
in turn, will be reflected in announcement returns. Some bank loans come with covenants
that require approval from banks for significant corporate events, including merger decisions.
In these cases, the evidence of banks’ actual monitoring of acquisition decisions can be found
in the wording of covenants or amendments to loan contracts. For example, the following
excerpts from the bank loan amendments illustrate the bank’s exercise of its monitoring role
in acquisitions (emphasis added):
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• Package ID: 25281; Company: Peebles Inc
“Credit was amended to modify certain definitions and to allow for co.’s acquisition
of Carlisle Retailers, Inc. Availability after merger must be a min of $10M.”
• Package ID: 55266; Company: North American Van Lines
“Credit was amended to modify certain terms and definitions to permit parent Allied
Worldwide, Inc. to acquire Moveline through a stock-for-stock merger.”
• Package ID: 117324; Company: Heico Corp
“Credit was amended to extend the term, and permit the acquisition of all of
the assets of Connectronics Corp and Wiremax Ltd in addition to a $30M
basket for mergers and acquisitions.”
• Package ID: 180708; Company: Deep Down Inc
“Credit was amended to provide the funding for the cash portion of company’s
acquisition of Mako Technologies Inc., increase TL facility amount and modify
certain financial covenant levels.”
Even for those bank loans without explicit acquisition provisions in their covenants, there
may still be a perception that bank monitoring improves potential acquisition outcomes.
Acquirers may care about how their relationship bank perceives the acquisition’s future per-
formance prospects, especially when the firm is heavily dependent on a single relationship
bank for its access to capital. Thus, more bank-dependent borrowing firms would tend to
interact with lending banks more frequently and consult more comprehensively with their
relationship banks regarding any acquisition plans. Shareholders may perceive that any an-
nounced acquisitions have been monitored and filtered out as good deals, and therefore this
“certification effect” may generate positive acquisition announcement returns.
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In contrast, however, bank lending relationships may also have negative effects on acqui-
sition incentives and performance due to bank conflicts of interest. Banks may attempt to
expand their share of the merger advisory market by offering below-market loans to potential
acquirers with already established relationships. By doing so, banks grant funds in order
to win lucrative and prestigious merger advisory contracts, regardless of the quality of the
acquisitions. Moreover, relationship banks may encourage acquisitions to enable troubled
firms to repay past debt obligations using the target firm’s resources or to generate future
lending business for the bank at the expense of the acquiring firm’s shareholders. Therefore,
whether the impact of bank relationships on acquisition activities is positive or negative is
an empirical question that is addressed in this paper.
The impact of bank relationships on acquisition activity should be most obvious in firms
that engage in multiple acquisitions (i.e. “multiple acquirers”). Thus, I focus on the connec-
tion between prior bank lending activity and multiple acquisitions. In this paper, I examine
the impact of prior bank lending relationships on acquisition decisions. I utilize the Loan
Pricing Corporation (LPC) DealScan database to define the prior bank lending intensity
for each acquiring firm over the three years prior to each acquisition announcement. I test
whether the impact of a prior lending relationship is consistent across three subsamples: (1)
multiple acquirers, (2) single acquirers, and (3) non-acquirers. I find that firms with most
intense prior lending relationships are most likely to engage in acquisition activities.
In addition, I investigate the method of payment as a potential channel used by rela-
tionship banks to exert influence on acquisition decisions. If banks provide cash to fund
acquisitions, the impact of the banking relationship may be manifest in the method of pay-
ment, rather than in the direct acquisition announcement effect or performance. I, therefore,
revisit the literature on the method of payment in acquisitions. That is, previous literature
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highlighting the method of payment (dating back to Travlos (1987)) focuses on the signaling
effect of cash versus stock payment for acquisitions. However, these studies fail to control for
the presence of a banking relationship that may enable the acquirer to finance the acquisi-
tion either directly through acquisition-related lending or indirectly through access to ready
credit. Utilizing a two-stage instrumental analysis, I control for the endogeneity in the deci-
sion to make acquisitions. Conditional upon the acquisition decision, the results show that
acquiring firms with bank lending relationships are more inclined to pay higher proportions
of cash per deal. Thus, the signaling effect of cash acquisitions may be augmented by the
certification effect of relationship bank lenders.
Finally, this paper measures the impact of bank relationships on acquisition announce-
ment returns. Controlling for the effects that lending relationships impact both the acqui-
sition decision and the method of payment, the empirical results show that a relationship
bank presence increases 3-day CARs around 52 basis points, inferring that beneficial effects
dominate deleterious effects resulting in positive announcement returns for acquirers with
prior bank lending relationships. This result is statistically significant when the target firm
is private, so that the bank’s certification effect is most valuable for informationally opaque
non-public firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews two strands of literature,
including bank lending relationships and acquisitions, as well as hypotheses development.
Section 1.3 discusses the data sets and descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 describes estimation
model and methodologies and explains the empirical results. Section 1.5 conducts robustness
tests and Section 1.6 summarizes the findings.
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1.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
1.2.1 Bank Relationship Literature
The field of relationship banking has extensively explored the cost of agency problems be-
tween borrowers and lenders (see Leland and Pyle (1977) and Diamond (1984, 1991)). In
order to minimize that cost, banks play the role of delegated monitors and produce private
information about their borrowers through monitoring activities. The benefit of such mon-
itoring is found in positive market reaction to the granting of bank loans, particularly by
relationship banks (see James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989)).
Further, Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), Berger and Udell (1995, 1996), and Bharath
et al. (2011) showed that the reduction in monitoring costs due to reusability of information
can be passed to borrowers through better loan terms, looser collateral requirements, and
greater funds availability. On the other hand, however, Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992)
identified the hold-up problem that occurs when the banks’ bargaining power expands.
The private information generated in the course of the lending relationship increases the
bank’s monopoly power, thereby enabling the bank to extract rents from the borrower. The
monopoly rents distort the firm’s incentives. This potential lock-in problem may be severe
especially when a borrower is very dependent on few banks, with negative implications for
the cost of credit and the availability of financing. The tradeoff between the benefits of
private information production and the costs of bank conflicts of interest has been studied
in many areas. For example, Puri (1996) examines bank underwriting of corporate bonds
and finds that the certification effect of monitoring dominates the hold-up effect.
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1.2.2 Mergers and Acquisitions Literature
Acquisitions are probably one of most important business activities in the arena of the cor-
porate finance. The role of delegated monitors is especially critical during acquisitions and
exerts an influence on borrowing firms. Therefore, I provide an overview of existing studies
in the field of mergers and acquisitions.
Early work in mergers and acquisitions suggests that value-enhancing mergers and ac-
quisitions mainly benefit target shareholders (see review papers, such as Jensen and Ruback
(1983), Jensen (1986, 1988), Jarrell et al. (1988), and Bruner (2002)). Shareholders of acquir-
ers, in contrast, earn insignificant or even negative returns, with positive returns in hostile
deals only (see review by Dutta and Jog (2009)).
Given the documented non-positive returns, researchers turn to examine the potential
determinants that drive the results. Hansen (1987) and Fishman (1989) utilized the embed-
ded contingent pricing feature of stock offers to develop theoretical models on the choice of
medium of exchange in M&A deals. Empirically, Travlos (1987) conducted an analysis of the
differential impacts of various methods of payment on announcement returns and found that
financing a takeover through exchange of common stocks is associated with lower abnormal
returns upon announcement of acquisitions, while financing via cash leads to zero abnormal
returns for the acquiring firms. He explained this phenomenon as the consequence of a per-
ceived overvaluation of the bidding firm. This explanation is consistent with the signaling
hypothesis that managers possess private information, so that they may have incentives to
finance the acquisition with stocks if they observe that the market price is higher than the
intrinsic value of the firm.
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More recent studies revisited the literature and reversed Travlos (1987)’s result that
stock acquisitions have negative cumulative abnormal returns under certain scenarios. Chang
(2002) found a positive return for stock offers in deals with privately-held targets and Betton
et al. (2008a) also documented a similar result, implying that the negative acquirer abnor-
mal returns were not solely driven by the usage of stock. Betton et al. (2008b) presented
some evidences suggesting that most M&A studies tend to be biased towards finding some
negative effects of the all-stock payment method because of the data availability (limited to
large and public acquirers/ targets). However, these studies fail to control for the presence of
a banking relationship that may enable the acquirer to finance the acquisition either directly
through acquisition-related lending or indirectly through access to ready credit. That is, the
documented increase in announcement returns for cash-financed acquisitions may be related
to bank financing of these deals. Thus, the bank’s willingness to lend to an acquiring firm
may serve as a certification signal that leads to better announcement returns for acquirers
using cash as the method of payment.
In addition to the method of payment and the status of the target, extant M&A literature
studies other bid premium determinants, such as the size effect (Jarrell and Poulsen (1989),
Asquith et al. (1983), and Jensen and Ruback (1983)), industry relevancy (Haleblian and
Finkelstein (1999)), managerial resistance (Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) and Baron (1983)),
acquirers’ market valuation (Raghavendra Rau and Vermaelen (1998)), acquirers’ corporate
governance mechanisms (Masulis et al. (2007)), merger fee structure (Saunders and Srini-
vasan (2001)), and the choice of advisers (Allen and Peristiani (2007)).
Another strand of the merger literature focuses on the performance and behavior of a
group of so-called frequent acquirers, or multiple acquirers. Both Schipper and Thompson
(1983) and Asquith et al. (1983) found positive returns for acquirers that engaged in acqui-
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sition programs, whereas Asquith et al. (1983) documented that returns up to the fourth
deal remained significantly positive. Ismail (2008) compared the performance of single ac-
quirers to that of multiple acquirers and found that, on average, single acquirers outperform
multiple acquirers. Moreover, multiple acquirers that had positive announcement returns in
their first acquisition suffer from hubris and overpay in subsequent acquisitions. Fuller et al.
(2002) identify multiple acquirers as firms that acquired more than five targets in a prior
three year period. In this paper, I add to the literature on multiple acquirers by examining
the role of bank relationships.
1.2.3 Hypotheses
Information asymmetries underlie both lending and M&A activities. The private informa-
tion that is produced in the course of a lending relationship can, therefore, be used in various
ways to impact the acquisition decision. That is, the presence of a relationship bank may
either increase or decrease the likelihood that a firm undertakes an acquisition. Since rela-
tionship banks monitor firm decisions, it could be posited that the presence of a relationship
bank reduces the likelihood that an acquisition is undertaken since the bank’s approval must
be obtained from the acquirer’s relationship bank.
However, the presence of a relationship bank may encourage acquisitions. The relation-
ship bank may facilitate value-enhancing acquisitions by using private information about
the operations of the acquiring firms to certify the value of the acquisition. Alternatively,
relationship banks could encourage value-reducing acquisitions in order to generate resources
that could be used to pay back past bank loans.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a prior bank lending relationship increases the
probability that a firm will initiate and complete one or more acquisitions.
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Hypothesis 1 posits that a firm is more likely to engage in and complete one or more
acquisitions if a prior bank lending relationship is present. Indeed, a corollary of Hypothesis
1 is that the more intense the banking relationship, the greater the acquisition probability.
Acquirers with intense prior banking relationships may have access to bank loans to finance
acquisitions. That is, a relationship bank can support and encourage acquisitions by sup-
plying a stable, non-equity funding source. The next hypothesis, therefore, focuses on the
impact of banking relationships on the method of payment in acquisition.
Hypothesis 2: The proportion of cash utilized in acquisitions increases if an ac-
quiring firm has established a relationship with any bank.
This hypothesis investigates the method of payment as one potential channel that re-
lationship banks can use to exert influence over acquisition decisions. A firm with prior
bank lending relationships may have access to stable funding sources (see Allen and Gale
(1997) analysis of intertemporal provision of liquidity by relationship banks) from relation-
ship banks, and may have a higher propensity to complete acquisitions with cash rather than
stock.
Hypothesis 3: The presence of a bank lending relationship increases with the
announcement abnormal returns to the acquiring firms.
This hypothesis examines the dominant forces of a bank lending relationship on M&A
performance. There are two conflicting forces of bank lending relationships on the acquisition
announcement effect. On one hand, the monitoring and certification functions that come
with the bank lending relationship may generate positive abnormal returns to the acquirer.
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On the other hand, a negative impact might come from the conflicts of interest from the
conflicting roles of lending relationship and financial advisers of acquisition.
1.3 Data and Variables
1.3.1 Data
Mergers and acquisitions data are extracted from the Thomson Securities Data Corpora-
tion’s (SDC Platinum) US M&A database. The acquirers are matched to Compustat via
CUSIP. If the acquirer’s CUSIP is not available, the acquirer’s immediate parent’s CUSIP
and the ultimate parent’s CUSIP were used.1
The daily stock returns are downloaded from Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) and bank loan data are obtained from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) DealScan
database2 3. Using the DealScan Compustat link table provided by Chava and Roberts
(2008), I match the corresponding loan records to Compustat data and then use the gvkey
as the linking identity variable to merge matched loan records to the M&A dataset. The
sample period ranges from January 1, 1990 to December 31, 2011. To be included, the
sample deals need to meet the following criteria:
1. U.S. acquirers that are public traded firms and have a matching record in Compustat.
1A manual check comparing acquirers’ names to company names on Computstat was implemented after
the CUSIPs matching to make sure that the matching procedure was consistent and to maximize the number
of matched observations.
2Bank lenders or banks in this paper refer to all types of lenders recognized by LPC DealScan database,
rather than narrowly defined commercial banks only.
3Following the literature (e.g. Bharath et al. (2007)), bank lending relationships in this paper are measured
using syndicated loan activity obtained from DealScan. Syndicated bank loans are important sources of
financing for mergers and acquisitions, and DealScan obtains data on borrowing by private firms. In contrast,
Compustat focuses on publicly-traded firms and does not distinguish between bank loans and non-relationship
sources of financing such as bond issues.
CHAPTER 1. BANK RELATIONSHIPS AND MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 12
2. Completed mergers, acquisitions, or tender offers with 50% or above shares owned after
the transactions.
3. The acquirer and the target must be different entities (i.e. stock repurchases are
excluded.)
4. Neither the acquirer nor the target is a utility (SIC ranges from 4900 to 4999) or a
financial institution (SIC ranges from 6000 to 6999.)4
To control for the impact of alternative funding sources on acquisition decisions and per-
formance (see Baker et al. (2007), Di Giuli (2013), and Eckbo et al. (2013)), I include the
issuance of public equity and debt in a year before the acquisition announcements as control
variables, obtained from SDC Platinum Global New Issues database. Furthermore, I control
for acquiring firm ownership concentration using data from Thomson-Reuters Institutional
Holdings (13F) database.
In total, my sample contains 18,246 acquisition deals, including 7,547 acquisition deals
conducted by single acquirers and 10,699 deals by multiple acquirers. Single acquirers are
defined as the firms who completed only one deal in any given year, whereas multiple ac-
quirers (or serial acquirers) are defined as the firms who completed more than one deal in a
specific year5.
I also construct an alternative dataset containing both acquirers and non-acquirers on a
firm-year basis by expanding the deal data across all the years in my sample period. In this
set of data, non-acquirers are included as a control group. A firm is defined as a non-acquirer
4Financial institutions and utility firms are excluded from the analysis since these mergers may be effected
by regulation and financial crises, thereby obscuring the impact of the relationship bank.
5Fuller et al. (2002)’s definition of multiple acquirers as 5 deals in a 3 year period is also adopted for
robustness tests. Results for the alternative definition of multiple acquirers by Fuller et al. (2002) are
consistent with the results presented and are available upon request.
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in a specific year if the firm does not have any matched deal record in that year. In total,
I have 64,248 firm years after considering the availability of control variables, which can be
decomposed into three categories: 45,971 non-acquirer firm years, 10,808 single-acquirer firm
years, and 7469 multiple-acquirer firm years.
The role of the relationship bank can be measured using an intensity variable (see Bharath
et al. (2007)), as defined either in terms of total number of deals or in terms of total dollar
amount of deals. These two relationship intensity measures are illustrated below.
RdealsM =
Number of deals by bankM to borrowerI in last 3 years
Total number of deals by borrowerI in last 3 years
RamountM =
Dollar amount by bankM to borrowerI in last 3 years
Total dollar amount of deals by borrowerI in last 3 years
Since each acquiring firm may establish lending relationships with multiple banks simulta-
neously, I utilize the largest relationship intensity measure across all relationship banks as
the proxy for the relationship intensity measure for each acquiring firm. For each acquiring
firm, the larger the maximum relationship intensity refers to a more concentrated reliance on
a particular lending bank, and a more bank-dependent reliance on bank loans as opposed to
other sources of financing. The rationale of using the maximum relationship intensity, rather
than the average or the minimum value, to proxy the role of bank lending relationships is
that a bank with a higher proportion of lending in and/ or a greater bank-dependent reliance
with a firm has greater incentives to monitor and therefore assumes a major delegated role
of monitoring (see Diamond (1984, 1991) and Leland and Pyle (1977)), while a bank with
relative lower proportions of lending in and/ or a looser reliance with a firm is more likely to
be a free rider and to shirk its monitoring duties even with larger amounts of lending to the
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firm. Thus, the relationship intensity measures applied to the later analyses are defined as:
• max Rdeals= Maximum of Rdeals of borrowerI across all banks.
• max Ramount= Maximum of Ramount of borrowerI across all banks.
• Relationship dummy equals to one if either max Rdeals or max Ramount exceeds
zero, and zero otherwise.
Table 1.2 reports summary statistics of the variables for both acquirers and non-acquirers.
Acquirers are more inclined to have bank lending relationships in the syndicated loan market
and have higher banking lending relationship intensities than non-acquirers, with the mean
difference significant at the 1% level. A list of control variable notations and definitions
is provided in the Table 1.1. Table 1.2 shows that acquirers are generally larger in size
(denoted as Size) and acquirers have larger tangible assets in value (Ppegt, Ppenb, or Tangi-
ble size). Acquirers and non-acquirers have similar level in return on assets (ROA), leverage
(Leverage), market-to-book ratio (MTB), and revenue growth rate (Revenue growth rate).
It is interesting to notice that the acquirers and non-acquirers have roughly the same level
of leverage, but acquirers tend to issue more debt in the one to three years prior to the
deal (Debt issuance1 or Debt issuance3). Furthermore, acquirers have more free cash flow,
both in value (FCF) and ratio scaled by total assets (FCF ratios). Acquirers also have higher
cash level (Cash), R&D expenses (Xrd), and selling and administration expenses (Xsga), but
the scaled cash (Cash ratio), scaled R&D expenses (Rnd exp), and scaled selling and ad-
ministration expenses (Selling exp) are relatively lower for acquirers than for non-acquirers.
Acquirers also tend to issue more new public equity and debt issuance in a preceding year
(Equity issue number lag, Debt issue number lag, Total equity issue amount lag, and To-
tal debt issue amount lag), but have a lower ownership concentration on average (Owner-
ship Concentration).
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Table 1.3 divides acquirers into two subsamples: single acquirers and multiple acquirers.
Multiple acquirers are, on average, larger in size and possess more tangible assets, cash,
and free cash flow. Multiple acquirers issue more debt in the past one to three years than
single acquirers do, but the leverage for multiple acquirers is not statistically different from
that for single acquirers. In addition, multiple acquirers are more likely to have banking
relationships (Relationship dummy) and develop more intense relationships (max Rdeals or
max Ramount), which is consistent with our hypotheses.
1.3.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the Eventus system [Cowan (2005) Even-
tus software, version 8.0]. Following Brown and Warner (1985) and Fuller et al. (2002),
market adjusted return model (MAR) estimates abnormal returns by subtracting the value-
weighted market index returns from stock returns6.
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated for a three-day event window, in-
cluding one day before the announcement date and one day after7. In the sample, some deals
are announced on non-trading dates, such as January 1 and December 31. For those deals,
the returns will be matched to the next available trading date. Following Fuller et al. (2002),
I exclude the clustered deals which were announced by a single acquirer on the same date or
within a three day window since I cannot disentangle the proportion of each individual deal
to the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns.
Table 1.4 presents the descriptive statistics of cumulative abnormal returns for vari-
6Results using CAPM market model (MM) to calculate abnormal returns are consistent with the results
using MAR model and are available upon request.
7The other two event windows, including five-day and eleven-day windows, are also calculated for robust-
ness tests and yield consistent results with ones with three-day event windows. Results are available upon
request.
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ous event windows, relationship intensity measurements, and other control variables on
a deal basis for single acquirers and for multiple acquirers. It follows that the acquisi-
tions conducted by multiple acquirers tend to have lower cumulative abnormal returns,
which is consistent with the results provided by Ismail (2008) that single acquirers out-
perform multiple acquirers. Also, all three lending relationship intensity measures are larger
for multiple acquirers than for single acquirers both on firm year basis (Table 1.3) and
on deal basis (Table 1.4). Multiple acquirers are more likely to acquire public targets
(Target public status), to pay cash for acquisitions or to use more cash in a cash/stock
deal (Cash dummy or Cash portion), and to conduct cross-border acquisitions (Crossbor-
der dummy) and larger deals (Valueoftransactionmil and Deal size). Consistent with pre-
vious firm year based sample, multiple acquirers have more new public equity and debt
issuance (Equity issue number lag, Debt issue number lag, Total equity issue amount lag,
and Total debt issue amount lag) but maintain a lower ownership concentration (Owner-
ship Concentration).
1.4 Estimation Models and Empirical Results
1.4.1 Bank Lending Relationships and the Propensity to Acquire
I first examine Hypothesis 1 to determine the impact of bank lending relationships on ac-
quisition decisions by utilizing firm-year based data. To determine whether the presence
of a banking relationship impacts the decision to become an acquirer, I use two estimation
models: a logit regression model and an ordinary least square regression model.
The dependent variable, Y, in the logit regression is a dummy variable that takes a value
of one if the firm makes an acquisition in any specific year. The logit regression is formulated
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as followed.
Y = α + β ∗Relationship Intensity + γ ∗Xfirm + ε (1.1)
Relationship intensity refers to three relationship intensity measurements, max Rdeals,
max Ramount, and Relationship dummy. Xfirm refers to a set of aforementioned firm-
specific control variables, including Size, Leverage, Debt issuance1 (net debt issuance in
the past one year), Debt issuance3 (net debt issuance in the past three years), FCF ratio
(scaled free cash flow), Cash ratio (scaled cash), Revenue growth rate, Rnd exp (scaled R&D
expense), Selling exp (selling expenses scaled by sales), ROA, Tangible size, MTB (market-
to-book ratio), Equity issue number lag (the number of new public equity issuance in a pre-
ceding year), Debt issue number lag (the number of new public debt issuance in a preceding
year), Total equity issue amount lag (total dollar amount of new public equity issuance in
a preceding year), Total debt issue amount lag (total dollar amount of new public debt is-
suance in a preceding year), and Ownership Concentration(Ownership Concentration in the
form of Herfindahl-Hirschman Index).
Table 1.5 reports the estimation results for equation (1.1). All of the coefficients for the
three relationship intensity variables are positive and significant, consistent with Hypothesis
1 that the likelihood of acquisition increases with the existence and intensity of the prior
bank lending relationship.
I now focus on the distinction between single and serial acquirers. I re-estimate equation
(1.1) for a subsample of acquiring firms. The dependent variable, Y, is defined as one if
the firm completes two or more acquisitions in a year, and zero if only one acquisition is
completed. The results, presented in Table 1.6, show that all three coefficients of relation-
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ship intensity variables are positive and significant. Thus, the more intense the bank lending
relationship, the more likely that the firm is a multiple acquirer.
Table 1.7 uses an OLS regression to re-estimate equation (1.1) in which Y is equal to the
number of acquisitions as the dependent variable. The OLS regression results reported in
Table 1.7 show that all of three relationship intensity measurements are positively correlated
to the number of acquisitions, consistent with Hypothesis 1.
The results shown in Table 1.5 to 1.7 may be subject to selection bias because of the
endogeneity of the acquisition decision. Thus, I utilize Propensity Score Matching to control
for comparable acquirers and non-acquirers in order to extract the pure lending relationship
effects, or so-called average effects of treatment to the treated (ATT). I use the same set of
control variables as in equation (1.1) to predict the propensity to be acquirers and assign
propensity scores to both acquirers and non-acquirers. I then pair acquirers to the nearest
neighbor non-acquirers using propensity scores and calculate the difference of relationship
intensity measures for each pair to obtain ATT. Table 1.8 column (1) reports the result of the
logit regression with Acquirer dummy as the dependent variable and the same set of firm-
specific variables in equation (1.1), and column (2), (3), and (4) present both unmatched
effects (coefficients for “ treated”) and treatment effects (“ATT”) for all three relationship
intensity variables between acquirers and non-acquirers with the t-statistics for treatment
effects provided at the bottom of tables. Table 1.9 reports the results of logit regression
(column (1)) and propensity matching models for relationship intensity variables (column
(2), (3), and (4)) between single acquirers and multiple acquirers. All of the treatments
effects are positive and significant, consistent with previous results and Hypothesis 1.
CHAPTER 1. BANK RELATIONSHIPS AND MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 19
1.4.2 Bank Lending Relationships and the Method of Payment
In this section, I examine the acquisition terms conditional on the decision to acquire. I
investigate the impact of bank lending relationships on the method of payment in an ac-
quisition. Conditional upon the fact that prior bank lending relationships have an impact
on acquisition decisions, relationship banks may enable the acquirers to finance the acquisi-
tions either directly through acquisition-related lending or indirectly through access to ready
credit. Thus, Hypothesis 2 postulates that the amount of cash or the proportion of cash
utilized in acquisitions increase if an acquiring firm has established a relationship with any
bank. To investigate this issue, I perform a series of analyses on deal-based data to obtain
a set of deal-specific control variables.
I follow Travlos (1987) and Fuller et al. (2002) and classify the method of payment into
three categories: all cash, all stock, or combined cash and stock (denoted “combo”). I create
one indicator to identify three different methods of payment and use all stock payment as a
base case for the multinomial logit regression model to estimate the impact of prior lending
relationships on the relative propensity of each category over the base case. The multinomial
logit regression is structured as followed in equation (1.2):
Y = α + β ∗Relationship Intensity + δ ∗Xdeal + γ ∗Xfirm + ε (1.2)
The dependent variable, Y, is an indicator variable to identify various methods of pay-
ment, equal to one for all cash, two for all stock, and three for combo, respectively, and all
stock payment serves as the base case for the multinomial logit regression. Xdeal refers to a set
of deal-related control variables, including a dummy for acquisitions conducted by multiple
acquirers (Multiple 2), a dummy for public targets (Target public status), a dummy for the
targets in the same industry with acquirers (Same industry dummy), a dummy for targets
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taking defense strategies (Defense dummy), a dummy for hostile deals (Hostile dummy), a
dummy for tender offer deals (Tender offer dummy), a dummy for cross-border deals (Cross-
boder dummy), relative sales between the acquirer and the target, and market value of equity
for acquirers one week before announcement (MVE 1w). However, either acquirer or tar-
get sales was missing in many cases, thereby creating a selection bias due to the loss of
observations. In order to mitigate this potential selection bias on the control variable rela-
tive sales, I create one additional indicator variable (Nonmissing relative) that identify deals
with available relative sales and one interaction term with this dummy and the original fig-
ures (Inter relative sales). Instead of controlling for relative sales, I use both the indicator
variable and the interaction term to avoid the loss of observations. Xfirm refers to a set of
acquirers’ firm-specific controls, including size (Acquirer size), leverage (Leverage), scaled
free cash flow (FCF ratio), ROA, the number of new public equity issuance in a preced-
ing year (Equity issue number lag), the number of new public debt issuance in a preceding
year (Debt issue number lag), total dollar amount of new public equity issuance in a pre-
ceding year (Total equity issue amount lag), and public debt issuance in a preceding year
(Total debt issue amount lag), and ownership concentration- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(Ownership Concentration).
Table 1.10 presents three multinomial logit regression results for three lending intensi-
ties (max Rdeals, max Ramount, and Relationship dummy) respectively. Each multinomial
logit regression produces two sets of coefficients to show the marginal impact of interested
variables on the specified method of payment relative to base case. For example, the co-
efficient for max Rdeals under “Cash” column is 0.144, referring that a one unit increase
in max Rdeals leads to 0.144 higher multinomial log-odds for all cash relative to all stock
payment. The result presented in Table 1.10 show that the higher lending intensity, the
greater probability of an acquisition with all cash payment or stock-cash combination pay-
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ment relative to all stock payment.
For robustness, I utilize other measures of the method of payment in Table 1.11. In par-
ticular, I define “Cash portion” as the proportion of cash in each deal to represent the usage
of cash. Table 1.11 shows the results for OLS regressions with cash portion as the dependent
variable over various prior lending relationship measures and other control variables men-
tioned in equation (1.2). OLS outputs reveal several interesting facts. First, bank lending
intensities does not account for the cash portion in contrast to the results in Table 1.10.
Second, the estimates for dummies for acquisitions with the target in the same industry
are negative and significant across all specifications, consistent with the equilibrium results
in Hansen (1987) and Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) theoretical model of the choice of
medium of exchange in M&As. Since acquiring a target in a different industry usually incurs
a relatively higher level of uncertainty, acquirers hence prefer to pay a lower cash portion
and a higher stock portion in order to take advantages of embedded contingent pricing fea-
ture in the stock offer. Moreover, the issuance of public equity (both in the number of
deals and dollar amount) in preceding years is negatively associated with the cash portion,
which is consistent with Baker et al. (2007)’s and Eckbo et al. (2013)’s observations. Finally,
Table 1.11 shows that multiple acquirers tend to pay a higher cash portion than do single
acquirers.
These considerations suggest that endogeneity may provide an explanation for the incon-
sistency between Table 1.10 and 1.11 with regard to the impact of banking relationships on
the method of payment in an acquisition. For example, if a firm has a higher propensity to
conduct multiple acquisitions in a given year, the firm may arrange its cash for acquisition
purposes strategically across acquisitions in advance, thereby impacting the usage of cash
for individual acquisitions. Thus, the usage of cash may be indirectly impacted by other
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factors that have influence on the propensity to be serial acquirers. Also, in the previous
section, I have shown that prior lending relationships impact the firm’s decision to acquire
regardless of the method of payment. Hypothesis 2 posits an impact of banking relation-
ships on the method of payment. However, since the banking relationship impacts both the
method of payment and the acquisition decisions, there is a simultaneity that makes the
use of OLS inappropriate for this analysis. Therefore, to address potential endogeneity and
simultaneity, I conduct an instrumental variable two-stage least square (IV 2SLS) analysis,
where the acquisition decision (dummy variable for multiple acquirers, or Multiple 2 is en-
dogenous8). I adopt two excluded instruments: GDP growth rate (GDP PCH) and the total
number of acquisitions on the M&A market in a year (max count year). GDP growth rate
reflects macroeconomic conditions, whereas the total number of mergers reflects trends in
merger waves. Both instruments impact firms’ acquisition decisions, but only impact the
method of payment indirectly through the acquisition likelihood channel. I control for the
same set of control variables used in equation (1.2) and include one more variable to control
for the sequence of acquisitions (Deal sequence), which might influence the usage of cash
via strategic manipulations. The results are shown in Table 1.12, in which columns (1),
(3) and (5) refer to the first stage regressions, while column (2), (4) and (6) refer to the
second stage regressions for different lending intensity measures. The coefficients for most of
lending intensities (except for Relationship dummy) are positive and statistically significant,
consistent with Hypothesis 2 stating that prior bank lending relationships have a positive
effect on the usage of cash in acquisitions.
To test the validity of the IV 2SLS regressions, I conduct the over-identifying tests, weak
instrument test, and endogeneity tests. According to Baun (2006), the validity of IV re-
8The results are consistent when using a continuous dependent variable (e.g., the natural log of the
number of acquisitions undertaken within a year) in place of the binary dependent variable in the first stage.
Results are available upon request.
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gression depends on two assumptions that require excluded instruments to be independently
distributed of the error process and to be sufficiently correlated with the endogenous vari-
able. The over-identifying test aims to test the first assumption about exclusion restrictions
and adopts Hansen J statistics for the null hypothesis that all instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term. Hansen J statistics (j) with P-value (jp) are provided at the bottom
of Table 1.12 with p-values for all specification showing that exclusion restrictions are not
rejected and confirming the validity of the IV regressions. Weak instrument problems can
be diagnosed directly through the coefficients of instruments in the first stage and the re-
sults show that both models are free from the weak instrument problem. Alternatively, I
report the F statistic (widstat) for weak identification by Cragg-Donald or Kleibergen-Paap
at the bottom of table. The critical value of 10% maximal IV size provided by Stock and
Yogo (2005) is 19.93, which is smaller than the F statistic reported (84.28, 83.78, and 83.19,
respectively for three models), inferring that we can reject the null hypothesis and conclud-
ing that we do not have a weak-instrument problem. Furthermore, I utilize an embedded
endogeneity test in Stata provided by Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-square test with the null
hypothesis that acquisition decision is properly exogenous in the model. The test statistics
(estat) has a P-value (estatp) less than 0.05, rejecting the validity of OLS regressions in favor
of IV regressions, lending support to validity of IV 2SLS regressions.
1.4.3 Bank Lending Relationships and Announcement Effects
After confirming the impact of prior lending relationships on both the acquisition decision
and the method of payment, I investigate the market’s reactions to the announcement of
acquisitions in which the acquirer has a prior bank lending relationship. Following most of
the traditional M&A literature, I use an OLS regression equation (1.3) shown below.
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CAR = α+ β ∗Relationship Intensity+ η ∗Cash portion+ δ ∗Xdeal + γ ∗Xfirm + ε (1.3)
Hypothesis 3 postulates that the presence of a bank lending relationship increases with
the announcement abnormal returns to the acquiring firms. Cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) serve as the dependent variable at the left hand side of the regression in equation
(1.3). To test Hypothesis 3, I control for relationship intensity measures, the method of pay-
ment, and the same sets of deal-specific and firm-specific control variables used in equation
(1.2). Fixed year effects and robust standard errors are also included in all regressions.
Table 1.13 reports the regression outputs of CARs for 3-day windows. Columns (1), (3),
and (5) report the base case for different lending intensities. The coefficients for different
intensities are all positive and statistically significant, consistent with Hypothesis 3 that the
acquiring firms with more intense bank lending relationships experience higher M&A an-
nouncement returns, ceteris paribus. However, since prior bank lending relationships have
an impact on the acquisition decision and the method of payment, there might be poten-
tial multicollinearity concerns among control variables in the regression. To address this
issue and control for this conditionality, I use the predicted values from OLS results (Linear
prediction) in equation (1.2) to replace both the dummy variable for multiple acquirers (Mul-
tiple 2) and the usage of cash (Cash portion) in the regressions presented in columns (2),
(4), and (6) respectively. All estimates for prior lending relationship intensities are positive
and significant across all specifications, consistent with Hypothesis 3.
Table 1.13 also demonstrates the economic significance of the presence of a bank lending
relationship. It shows that a relationship bank presence increases 3-day CARs around 52 ba-
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sis points (over a 3-day event window) in column (5) to (7) after controlling for Cash portion
or Cash dummy. In addition, the coefficients for Cash portion or Cash dummy are all posi-
tive and significant across all models, which is in line with documented positive cash effects
in Travlos (1987). What deserved to be mentioned the most is that the announcement
effects of one standard deviation increase in relationship lending intensities (max Rdeals
= 0.479 ∗ 0.538 = 0.2577, max Ramount = 0.483 ∗ 0.530 = 0.2560, or Relationship dummy
= 0.496 ∗ 0.528 = 0.2619) are much greater than those of one standard deviation increase in
Cash portion (= 45.361 ∗ 0.00394 = 0.1787) or in Cash dummy (= 0.458 ∗ 0.379 = 0.1736),
illustrating one important fact that the effect of influential signals embedded in prior lending
relationships dominates the signaling effect of the cash usage.
To further disentangle the effects of bank lending relationships from the documented ef-
fect of method of payment, I perform regression analyses separately for subsamples with and
without the use of cash. The results in Table 1.14 show that the coefficient estimates for all
three lending intensity variables are significant across all specifications, confirming previous
conjectures that banks are more knowledge intermediaries. When cash is used as a method
of payment to pay for the acquisition, the market responds positively to acquirers’ lending
intensities during announcement windows, implying a positive value for relationship bank
monitoring. On the other hand, when cash is not used (100% stock is used for payment),
the findings indicate that the monitoring role still matters and the magnitude of the moni-
toring effect is greater than the contribution even if cash is used. That is, the involvement
of relationship banks is viewed as certification of the value of the target to the acquiring firm.
To investigate the value of monitoring roles of lending relationships in terms of the level
of information asymmetry, I divide the samples into acquisitions of private targets (a group
of acquisitions with high level of information asymmetry) and acquisitions of public targets
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(a group of acquisitions with low level of information asymmetry). Table 1.15 shows that the
positive effects of three lending intensities are statistically significant only for acquisitions
of private targets, but not for acquisitions of public targets. This finding implies that bank
monitoring is especially valuable in acquisitions with high level of information asymmetry,
which is consistent with the conjectured value of bank certification services.
1.5 Robustness Tests
My sample is constructing utilizing the entire universe of Compustate firms and assigning
zero lending relationships to firms that never appear in DealScan during the sample period.
However, a borrowing firm may not have a record in DealScan because its loans are too
small or the firm does not report syndicated bank loans publicly. To test whether my sam-
ple construction methodology imparts a selection bias into my analysis, I adopt the Heckman
probit procedure embedded in Stata. The first stage estimates the likelihood that a firm has
a record in DealScan at any time during my sample period from 1990 to 2011 (i.e. if there
is a record, then DealScan match is equal to one, and zero otherwise). Then I re-estimate
the model in equation (1.1) and present the estimated results in Table 1.16.
Table 1.16 column (1) reports the first stage of probit estimations with the dependent
variable (DealScan match) that identifies whether the firm ever appears in DealScan database
and with all firm-specific variables, except for lending intensities, serving as identifying con-
trol variables. Table 1.16 column (2)-(4) report the estimations of the second stage with
controls of three lending relationship intensities (max Rdeals, max Ramount, and Relation-
ship dummy) respectively. The estimated coefficients for three lending intensity measure-
ments are all positive and significant after correcting for the aforementioned selection bias,
confirming the validity of the fundamental analyses of the impact of bank lending relation-
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ships on mergers and acquisitions as shown in Table 1.5.
Another robustness check involves an alternative measurement of the intensity of a bank-
ing relationship. Rather than using total bank loans as the denominators, I utilize total
liabilities in order to examine the importance of lending relationships in the context of the
firm’s whole debt structure. Thus, I define the Ramount ratio as follows:
Ramount ratio =
Dollar amount by bankMax amount to borrowerI in last 3 years
Borrower′Is average of total liabilities in last 3 years
Table 1.16 column (5) presents a positive and significant coefficient for Ramount ratio,
which is consistent with prior findings that the presence of a prior bank lending relationship
increases the probability that a firm will initiate and complete one or more acquisitions after
correcting for potential selection bias.
1.6 Conclusion
Through their special role as information providers, banks establish and maintain lending
relationships with borrowers that may also impact the borrowing firms’ business decisions.
Mergers and acquisitions are one of the most important business decisions that may benefit
from the information production of a relationship bank.
I find that the presence of a prior bank lending relationship increases the probability
that a firm will initiate and complete acquisitions. Moreover, the more intense the bank
lending relationship, the more monitoring activity and the greater the likelihood of multiple
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acquisitions. Conditional on completing acquisitions, the existence and intensity of prior
bank lending relationships are found to be positively associated with the usage of cash as a
method of payment in the acquisitions. Furthermore, the results of positive announcement
effects indicate that the market perceives the monitoring involved in prior bank lending
relationships as certifying the quality of acquisitions, particularly when the target is an
informationally opaque non-public firm. Thus, the deal announcement effect is positively
impacted by the presence of an intense bank lending relationship. Banks influence the
acquisition performance via the provision of financing to their relationship borrowers.
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Table 1.1: Variable Notations and Definitions
Variable Notation Definition
Lending relationship variables
Relationship dummy Dummy variable=1 if the acquirer has established lending relationships
with any banks
max Rdeals Acquirers’ maximum relationship intensity in terms of number of deals
across all lenders
max Ramount Acquirers’ maximum relationship intensity in terms of dollar amount
across all lenders
Firm-specific variables
Size (Acquire size) Natural logarithm of total assets
ROA Return on Assets, or the ratio of EBIT over total assets
Ppegt Property, Plant and Equipment - Total (Gross)
Ppenb Property, Plant, and Equipment - Total (Net)
Tangible size Natural logarithm of Ppegt
Leverage The ratio of debt (both long term and short term portion) over total
assets
Debt issuance1 Net debt issuance in the past one year
Debt issuance3 Net debt issuance in the past three years
MTB Market to book ratio, or the ratio of market value over total assets
Revenue growth rate Annual revenue growth rate
FCF Free cash flow, or the difference between net operating cash flow and
capital expenditures
FCF ratio Scaled free cash flow by total assets
Cash Cash
Cash ratio Scaled cash by total assets
Xrd Research and development expenses
Rnd exp Scaled research and development expenses by sales
Xsga Selling, general and administrative expenditures
Selling exp Scaled selling, general and administrative expenditures by sales
Total deals The annual number of acquisition deals the firm conducts
Equity issue number lag The number of public equity issuance one year prior than acquisitions
Debt issue number lag The number of public debt issuance one year prior than acquisitions
Total equity issue amount lag Total dollar amount (in million) of equity issuance one year prior than
acquisitions
Total debt issue amount lag Total dollar amount (in million) of debt issuance one year prior than
acquisitions
Ownership Concentration Institutional ownership concentration in the form of Herfind-
ahlHirschman Index
Deal-specific variables
CAR MAR V(E)W 3(5,11)day 3(5,11) day cumulative abnormal returns by value-weighted (equal-
weighted) benchmark portfolio
Target public status Dummy variable=1 if the target is a public firm
Cash dummy Dummy variable=1 if the acquisition is conducted by 100% cash
Cash portion The portion of cash involved in the acquisition transaction
Same industry dummy Dummy variable=1 if the acquirer and the target share the same 2-digit
SIC
Defense dummy Dummy variable=1 if the target adopts any defense strategy
Hostile dummy Dummy variable=1 if the acquisition is hostile
Tender offer dummy Dummy variable=1 if the acquisition deal is a tender offer
Crossborder dummy Dummy variable=1 if the target is a non-US firm
Valueoftransactionmil The dollar amount of the acquisition transactions
Deal size Natural logarithm of dollar amount of the acquisition transactions
Relative sales The ratio of acquirers’ annual sales amount over targets’ annual sales
amount
MVE 1w Market value of equity of acquirers one week before the acquisition an-
nouncements
Multiple 2 Dummy variable=1 if the acquirers conduct more than one acquisition
in a year
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Table 1.5: Logit Regressions: Bank Lending Relationships and Acquisition Decisions (Non-
Acquirers vs Acquirers)
Dependent variable: Acquirer Dummy; Independent variable notations and definitions are
provided in Table 1.1. Fixed year effect has been considered in all models.
(1) (2) (3)







Size 0.595∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -0.0547 -0.0583 -0.0595
(0.151) (0.129) (0.123)
Debt issuance1 0.0000564∗∗∗ 0.0000564∗∗∗ 0.0000564∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt issuance3 -0.0000159∗∗ -0.0000159∗∗ -0.0000159∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
FCF ratio -0.101 -0.1000 -0.0990
(0.102) (0.105) (0.109)
Cash ratio -1.680∗∗∗ -1.678∗∗∗ -1.684∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth rate -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.777) (0.779) (0.782)
Rnd exp -0.0756∗∗∗ -0.0755∗∗∗ -0.0757∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Selling exp -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007
(0.642) (0.644) (0.646)
ROA 0.0954∗ 0.0957∗ 0.0966∗
(0.083) (0.083) (0.080)
Tangible size -0.404∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗ -0.404∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MTB 0.0275∗∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0278∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Equity issue number lag 0.233∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt issue number lag 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.000103∗ -0.000103∗ -0.000103∗
(0.078) (0.078) (0.080)
Total debt issue amount lag 0.000004 0.000004 0.000004
(0.801) (0.793) (0.790)
Ownership Concentration -1.642∗∗∗ -1.640∗∗∗ -1.641∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 64248 64248 64248
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.103 0.103
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Logit Regressions: Bank Lending Relationships and Acquisition Decisions (Single
vs Multiple Acquirers)
Dependent variable: Multiple Dummy; Independent variable notations and definitions are
provided in Table 1.1. Fixed year effect has been considered in all models.
(1) (2) (3)







Size 0.592∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -0.0970 -0.0989 -0.104
(0.237) (0.229) (0.207)
Debt issuance1 0.000009 0.000009 0.000009
(0.631) (0.632) (0.632)
Debt issuance3 0.000008 0.000008 0.000008
(0.426) (0.425) (0.424)
FCF ratio -0.127 -0.126 -0.124
(0.470) (0.473) (0.479)
Cash ratio -1.540∗∗∗ -1.542∗∗∗ -1.542∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth rate 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗ 0.0109∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Rnd exp -0.114 -0.114 -0.114
(0.173) (0.172) (0.174)
Selling exp -0.00535 -0.00534 -0.00531
(0.543) (0.543) (0.545)
ROA 0.113 0.113 0.112
(0.345) (0.346) (0.353)
Tangible size -0.320∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MTB 0.0104 0.0106 0.0108
(0.127) (0.123) (0.115)
Equity issue number lag 0.275∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt issue number lag -0.0155 -0.0154 -0.0154
(0.452) (0.455) (0.454)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.000165∗ -0.000165∗ -0.000165∗
(0.066) (0.065) (0.066)
Total debt issue amount lag 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002
(0.341) (0.340) (0.341)
Ownership Concentration -0.296∗∗∗ -0.296∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 18277 18277 18277
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.071 0.071
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.7: OLS Regressions: Bank Lending Relationships and Acquisition Decisions
Dependent variable: Number of annual acquisitions; Independent variable notations and
definitions are provided in Table 1.1. Fixed year effect has been considered in all models.
(1) (2) (3)







Size 0.318∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -0.0110 -0.0118 -0.0121
(0.390) (0.355) (0.343)
Debt issuance1 0.0000590∗∗∗ 0.0000590∗∗∗ 0.0000590∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt issuance3 0.0000161∗∗∗ 0.0000161∗∗∗ 0.0000161∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FCF ratio -0.0332 -0.0330 -0.0327
(0.169) (0.171) (0.175)
Cash ratio -0.568∗∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗ -0.569∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth rate -0.0000117 -0.0000109 -0.0000103
(0.966) (0.968) (0.970)
Rnd exp 0.000188 0.000199 0.000205
(0.831) (0.821) (0.816)
Selling exp 0.0000420 0.0000423 0.0000424
(0.875) (0.874) (0.874)
ROA 0.0128 0.0126 0.0125
(0.319) (0.323) (0.327)
Tangible size -0.193∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MTB 0.000413 0.000461 0.000487
(0.670) (0.634) (0.615)
Equity issue number lag 0.177∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt issue number lag 0.0909∗∗∗ 0.0908∗∗∗ 0.0910∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.0000222∗∗ -0.0000223∗∗ -0.0000226∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Total debt issue amount lag 0.0000393∗∗∗ 0.0000394∗∗∗ 0.0000395∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ownership Concentration -0.254∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 64248 64248 64248
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.106 0.106
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Propensity Score Matching - Treatment= Acquirer Dummy
Column (1) reports the result of the logit regression with Acquirer Dummy as the dependent
variable and a set of firm-specific variables as independent variables. Column (2), (3),
and (4) report both the unmatched ( treated) and matched (att) results of the propensity
matching models for three relationship intensity variables (max Rdeals, max Ramount, and
Relationship dummy) respectively. A list of independent variable notations and definitions
is provided in Table 1.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)

























Equity issue number lag 0.264∗∗∗
(0.000)
Debt issue number lag 0.153∗∗∗
(0.000)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.000118∗∗
(0.046)






treated 0.150∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 0.384∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ATT 0.0412 0.0425 0.0439
seatt 0.00620 0.00626 0.00644
t 6.638 6.797 6.814
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.9: Propensity Score Matching - Treatment= Multiple Acquirer Dummy
Column (1) reports the result of the logit regression with Multiple Acquirer Dummy as the
dependent variable and a set of firm-specific variables as independent variables. Column (2),
(3), and (4) report both the unmatched ( treated) and matched (att) results of the propensity
matching models for three relationship intensity variables (max Rdeals, max Ramount, and
Relationship dummy) respectively. A list of independent variable notations and definitions
is provided in Table 1.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4)

























Equity issue number lag 0.304∗∗∗
(0.000)
Debt issue number lag 0.00872
(0.673)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.000179∗∗
(0.046)






treated 0.113∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
cons 0.488∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ATT 0.0262 0.0255 0.0264
seatt 0.0102 0.0103 0.0105
t 2.574 2.483 2.506
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.10: Multinomial Logit Regressions: The Method of Payment
Base case for each set of multinomial logit regression: Stock dummy (dummy for all stock
payments); Dependent variable: Cash dummy (dummy for all cash payments); Combo
dummy (dummy for cash/stock combinations); Independent variable notations and defi-
nitions are listed in Table 1.1. Fixed year effect has been considered in all models.
(1) (2) (3)
Method of payment Method of payment Method of payment
Cash Combo Cash Combo Cash Combo
max Rdeals 0.144∗∗ 0.117∗
(0.023) (0.056)
max Ramount 0.144∗∗ 0.133∗∗
(0.022) (0.028)
Relationship dummy 0.114∗ 0.111∗
(0.062) (0.059)
Multiple 2 -0.00764 -0.0164 -0.00774 -0.0168 -0.00708 -0.0163
(0.898) (0.772) (0.897) (0.766) (0.905) (0.773)
Target public status -1.159∗∗∗ -1.175∗∗∗ -1.159∗∗∗ -1.175∗∗∗ -1.159∗∗∗ -1.175∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Same industry dummy -0.0809 -0.132∗∗ -0.0814 -0.132∗∗ -0.0815 -0.132∗∗
(0.148) (0.014) (0.146) (0.014) (0.145) (0.014)
Defense dummy -0.568∗∗∗ -0.637∗∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗ -0.635∗∗∗ -0.570∗∗∗ -0.638∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Hostile dummy 1.820∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗ 1.819∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗ 1.823∗∗∗ 1.095∗∗
(0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.032)
Tender offer dummy 0.470∗∗∗ 0.193 0.470∗∗∗ 0.192 0.471∗∗∗ 0.194
(0.008) (0.288) (0.008) (0.290) (0.008) (0.286)
Crossborder dummy 0.544∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Deal size -0.363∗∗∗ 0.0428∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ 0.0427∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ 0.0428∗∗
(0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.037)
Nonmissing relative sales dummy 0.243∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Inter relative sales -0.00003∗∗ -0.00005∗∗ -0.00003∗∗ -0.00005∗∗ -0.00003∗∗ -0.00005∗∗
(0.019) (0.030) (0.019) (0.030) (0.019) (0.030)
MVE 1w -0.00721∗∗∗ -0.00577∗∗∗ -0.00720∗∗∗ -0.00574∗∗∗ -0.00722∗∗∗ -0.00574∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquirer size 0.453∗∗∗ -0.0161 0.452∗∗∗ -0.0177 0.453∗∗∗ -0.0169
(0.000) (0.508) (0.000) (0.467) (0.000) (0.488)
Leverage 2.184∗∗∗ 2.089∗∗∗ 2.179∗∗∗ 2.077∗∗∗ 2.189∗∗∗ 2.082∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FCF ratio 2.222∗∗∗ 1.260∗∗∗ 2.221∗∗∗ 1.262∗∗∗ 2.221∗∗∗ 1.264∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 1.432∗∗∗ 0.0331 1.435∗∗∗ 0.0286 1.442∗∗∗ 0.0305
(0.000) (0.851) (0.000) (0.871) (0.000) (0.862)
Equity issue number lag -0.0992 0.0385 -0.0999 0.0374 -0.0988 0.0381
(0.143) (0.534) (0.140) (0.545) (0.145) (0.537)
Debt issue number lag 0.0297 0.0468 0.0297 0.0467 0.0298 0.0467
(0.444) (0.242) (0.443) (0.242) (0.444) (0.243)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.0003∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0003∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0003∗∗ -0.0002
(0.038) (0.227) (0.038) (0.230) (0.037) (0.227)
Total debt issue amount lag 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005
(0.352) (0.371) (0.352) (0.373) (0.346) (0.367)
Ownership Concentration 0.157 0.836∗∗∗ 0.158 0.838∗∗∗ 0.157 0.837∗∗∗
(0.458) (0.000) (0.455) (0.000) (0.458) (0.000)
Observations 12660 12660 12660
Pseudo R2 0.163 0.163 0.163
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.11: OLS Regressions: The Method of Payment
Dependent variable: Cash Portion (the proportion of cash payment utilized in the acqui-
sitions); Independent variable notations and definitions are listed in Table 1.1. Fixed year
effect and robust standard errors have been considered in all models.
(1) (2) (3)







Multiple 2 2.649∗∗∗ 2.650∗∗∗ 2.655∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Target public status -1.333 -1.332 -1.334
(0.245) (0.245) (0.245)
Same industry dummy -2.800∗∗∗ -2.800∗∗∗ -2.805∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Defense dummy -16.20∗∗∗ -16.20∗∗∗ -16.21∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hostile dummy 30.99∗∗∗ 30.99∗∗∗ 30.97∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tender offer dummy -4.223∗∗ -4.224∗∗ -4.214∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Crossborder dummy -1.060 -1.059 -1.061
(0.240) (0.240) (0.239)
Deal size -0.0987 -0.0986 -0.0982
(0.671) (0.671) (0.672)
Nonmissing relative sales dummy 7.580∗∗∗ 7.581∗∗∗ 7.588∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Inter relative sales -0.00005∗∗∗ -0.00005∗∗∗ -0.00005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MVE 1w -0.0131 -0.0132 -0.0135
(0.299) (0.297) (0.284)
Acquirer size 0.421 0.423 0.439
(0.125) (0.124) (0.110)
Leverage 1.751 1.767 1.895
(0.291) (0.288) (0.256)
FCF ratio 25.10∗∗∗ 25.09∗∗∗ 25.05∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 1.019 1.027 1.092
(0.723) (0.721) (0.704)
Equity issue number lag -2.172∗∗∗ -2.169∗∗∗ -2.160∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Debt issue number lag -0.771∗∗ -0.771∗∗ -0.770∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.003∗ -0.003∗ -0.003∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058)
Total debt issue amount lag 0.0005∗∗ 0.0005∗∗ 0.0005∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Ownership Concentration -5.103∗∗ -5.106∗∗ -5.143∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028)
Observations 18246 18246 18246
Adjusted R2 0.082 0.082 0.082
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.12: IV 2SLS Regressions: Bank Lending Relationships and the Method of Payment
Dependent variable: (1) Multiple 2 (First Stage); (2) Cash Portion (Second Stage); (3)
Multiple 2 (First Stage); (4) Cash Portion (Second Stage); (5) Multiple 2 (First Stage);
(6) Cash Portion (Second Stage). Excluded instrument variables: GDP PCH represents
GDP growth rate and max count year denotes the total number of acquisitions in M&A
market in a year. Deal sequence identifies the sequence of the acquisitions conducted by the
same acquirer in a given year. Other control variable notations and definitions are listed in
Table 1.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
max Rdeals 0.0162∗∗ 1.822∗
(0.031) (0.062)
max Ramount 0.0181∗∗ 1.727∗
(0.016) (0.078)
Relationship dummy 0.0188∗∗∗ 1.217
(0.010) (0.207)
Multiple 2 -77.24∗∗∗ -77.34∗∗∗ -77.19∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP PCH 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
max count year 0.00003∗∗∗ 0.00003∗∗∗ 0.00003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Deal sequence 0.0943∗∗∗ 7.367∗∗∗ 0.0943∗∗∗ 7.378∗∗∗ 0.0943∗∗∗ 7.364∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Target public status -0.00407 -3.506∗∗ -0.00410 -3.516∗∗ -0.00415 -3.528∗∗
(0.726) (0.018) (0.724) (0.018) (0.721) (0.017)
Same industry dummy -0.00543 -2.583∗∗∗ -0.00540 -2.585∗∗∗ -0.00536 -2.590∗∗∗
(0.408) (0.002) (0.411) (0.002) (0.414) (0.002)
Defense dummy -0.0398 -23.22∗∗∗ -0.0397 -23.24∗∗∗ -0.0399 -23.29∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.000) (0.209) (0.000) (0.207) (0.000)
Hostile dummy -0.0658 21.17∗∗∗ -0.0657 21.16∗∗∗ -0.0655 21.16∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.010) (0.303) (0.010) (0.305) (0.010)
Tender offer dummy -0.0321∗ -8.150∗∗∗ -0.0322∗ -8.148∗∗∗ -0.0322∗ -8.131∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.000) (0.055) (0.000) (0.054) (0.000)
Crossborder dummy -0.0259∗∗∗ -2.433∗∗ -0.0259∗∗∗ -2.438∗∗ -0.0259∗∗∗ -2.439∗∗
(0.003) (0.035) (0.003) (0.034) (0.003) (0.034)
Deal size -0.0212∗∗∗ -1.502∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗ -1.504∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗ -1.499∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Nonmissing relative sales dummy 0.0150∗ 8.557∗∗∗ 0.0149∗ 8.555∗∗∗ 0.0148∗ 8.562∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.000) (0.067) (0.000) (0.069) (0.000)
Inter relative sales 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.426) (0.282) (0.423) (0.282) (0.421) (0.278)
MVE 1w -0.00112∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗∗ -0.00112∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗ -0.00112∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquirer size 0.0558∗∗∗ 5.890∗∗∗ 0.0557∗∗∗ 5.900∗∗∗ 0.0556∗∗∗ 5.930∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.0422∗∗ 1.664 0.0409∗∗ 1.658 0.0397∗∗ 1.820
(0.012) (0.449) (0.015) (0.451) (0.018) (0.408)
FCF ratio -0.0243 32.38∗∗∗ -0.0238 32.40∗∗∗ -0.0233 32.37∗∗∗
(0.439) (0.000) (0.450) (0.000) (0.459) (0.000)
ROA 0.0517∗∗ -2.627 0.0510∗∗ -2.628 0.0504∗∗ -2.542
(0.036) (0.417) (0.039) (0.417) (0.041) (0.432)
Equity issue number lag 0.0716∗∗∗ 2.990∗∗ 0.0715∗∗∗ 2.989∗∗ 0.0714∗∗∗ 2.994∗∗
(0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.019)
Debt issue number lag 0.00321 -1.179∗∗ 0.00320 -1.179∗∗ 0.00317 -1.182∗∗
(0.409) (0.018) (0.410) (0.018) (0.415) (0.018)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.000 -0.003∗ -0.000 -0.003∗ -0.000 -0.003∗
(0.979) (0.081) (0.983) (0.081) (0.988) (0.079)
Total debt issue amount lag 0.000004 0.00102∗∗ 0.000004 0.00102∗∗ 0.000004 0.00102∗∗
(0.252) (0.012) (0.253) (0.012) (0.252) (0.012)
Ownership Concentration -0.0841∗∗∗ -13.74∗∗∗ -0.0838∗∗∗ -13.75∗∗∗ -0.0834∗∗∗ -13.76∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
j 0.269 0.272 0.290
jdf 1 1 1
jp 0.604 0.602 0.590
widstat 84.28 83.78 83.19
estat 102.7 102.3 101.3
estatdf 1 1 1
estatp 3.98e-24 4.71e-24 8.10e-24
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.13: OLS Regressions: Announcement Effects (3-day event window)
Dependent variable: CAR MAR VW 3day; Linear prediction refers to the predicted value
of cash portion from Table 1.12 regressions. Other independent variable notations and
definitions are listed in Table 1.1. Fixed year effect and robust standard errors have been
considered in all models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR CAR
max Rdeals 0.538∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
max Ramount 0.530∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Relationship dummy 0.528∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Multiple 2 -0.195 -0.195 -0.196 -0.194
(0.246) (0.245) (0.244) (0.249)




Linear prediction 0.00131 0.00132 0.00132
(0.561) (0.559) (0.558)
Target public status -2.508∗∗∗ -2.507∗∗∗ -2.509∗∗∗ -2.509∗∗∗ -2.510∗∗∗ -2.509∗∗∗ -2.525∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Same industry dummy 0.171 0.164 0.171 0.163 0.172 0.164 0.166
(0.266) (0.291) (0.267) (0.292) (0.265) (0.290) (0.281)
Defense dummy -1.783∗∗∗ -1.816∗∗∗ -1.782∗∗∗ -1.815∗∗∗ -1.786∗∗∗ -1.819∗∗∗ -1.817∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Hostile dummy 1.560∗∗ 1.659∗∗ 1.560∗∗ 1.660∗∗ 1.569∗∗ 1.668∗∗ 1.599∗∗
(0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.029)
Tender offer dummy -0.0658 -0.0647 -0.0646 -0.0635 -0.0652 -0.0641 -0.0715
(0.804) (0.805) (0.807) (0.808) (0.805) (0.807) (0.787)
Crossborder dummy -0.186 -0.183 -0.186 -0.184 -0.187 -0.184 -0.189
(0.241) (0.243) (0.240) (0.242) (0.239) (0.241) (0.234)
Deal size 0.400∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗ 0.409∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Nonmissing relative sales dummy 0.209 0.226 0.208 0.225 0.206 0.223 0.222
(0.231) (0.206) (0.235) (0.209) (0.238) (0.212) (0.207)
Inter relative sales 0.000003∗∗∗ 0.000003∗∗∗ 0.000003∗∗∗ 0.000003∗∗∗ 0.000003∗∗∗ 0.000003∗∗∗ 0.000003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MVE 1w 0.00660∗∗∗ 0.00649∗∗∗ 0.00663∗∗∗ 0.00653∗∗∗ 0.00668∗∗∗ 0.00657∗∗∗ 0.00672∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquiror size -0.590∗∗∗ -0.604∗∗∗ -0.591∗∗∗ -0.605∗∗∗ -0.592∗∗∗ -0.605∗∗∗ -0.603∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 1.229∗∗∗ 1.222∗∗∗ 1.218∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗∗ 1.197∗∗∗ 1.191∗∗∗ 1.216∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
FCF ratio 0.597 0.650 0.603 0.657 0.608 0.662 0.637
(0.674) (0.642) (0.671) (0.639) (0.668) (0.636) (0.652)
ROA -0.361 -0.353 -0.365 -0.356 -0.369 -0.361 -0.366
(0.712) (0.718) (0.709) (0.715) (0.706) (0.712) (0.709)
Equity issue number lag -0.564∗∗∗ -0.584∗∗∗ -0.566∗∗∗ -0.587∗∗∗ -0.567∗∗∗ -0.587∗∗∗ -0.565∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Debt issue number lag -0.0106 -0.0130 -0.0105 -0.0129 -0.0109 -0.0133 -0.0114
(0.850) (0.817) (0.851) (0.817) (0.846) (0.813) (0.838)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004
(0.877) (0.854) (0.877) (0.854) (0.883) (0.860) (0.873)
Total debt amount lag 0.00005∗∗ 0.00005∗∗ 0.00005∗∗ 0.00005∗∗ 0.00005∗∗ 0.00005∗∗ 0.00005∗∗
(0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021)
Ownership Concentration 2.412∗∗∗ 2.423∗∗∗ 2.414∗∗∗ 2.426∗∗∗ 2.426∗∗∗ 2.438∗∗∗ 2.435∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 18246 18246 18246 18246 18246 18246 18246
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.023
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.14: OLS Regressions: Announcement Effects (3-day event window)
Dependent variable: CAR MAR VW 3day; Independent variable notations and definitions
are listed in Table 1.1. Column (1),(3), and (5) report the regression results for acquisi-
tions conducted with zero cash payment (Cash portion(CP)=0), while column (2), (4), and
(6) report the results for acquisitions with full or at least partial cash payment involved
(Cash portion(CP)>0). Fixed year effect and robust standard errors have been considered
in all models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CP=0 CP>0 CP=0 CP>0 CP=0 CP>0
max Rdeals 0.624∗ 0.434∗∗
(0.057) (0.019)
max Ramount 0.609∗ 0.433∗∗
(0.058) (0.020)
Relationship dummy 0.602∗ 0.438∗∗
(0.051) (0.016)
Multiple 2 -0.335 -0.0362 -0.335 -0.0363 -0.336 -0.0370
(0.238) (0.842) (0.237) (0.841) (0.237) (0.838)
Target public status -3.939∗∗∗ -1.342∗∗∗ -3.943∗∗∗ -1.343∗∗∗ -3.947∗∗∗ -1.342∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Same industry dummy 0.344 0.0162 0.345 0.0157 0.345 0.0165
(0.197) (0.921) (0.196) (0.924) (0.196) (0.920)
Defense dummy -1.054 -1.405 -1.054 -1.403 -1.057 -1.405
(0.216) (0.147) (0.216) (0.148) (0.215) (0.147)
Hostile dummy 1.270 0.709 1.288 0.705 1.315 0.708
(0.460) (0.360) (0.454) (0.363) (0.444) (0.363)
Tender offer dummy 0.0274 -0.222 0.0290 -0.222 0.0275 -0.222
(0.936) (0.591) (0.933) (0.593) (0.936) (0.593)
Crossborder dummy -0.265 -0.174 -0.265 -0.175 -0.268 -0.174
(0.270) (0.404) (0.269) (0.403) (0.266) (0.405)
Deal size 0.342∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000)
Nonmissing relative sales dummy 0.194 0.227 0.194 0.225 0.194 0.223
(0.489) (0.283) (0.488) (0.287) (0.490) (0.291)
Inter relative sales 0.000005∗∗∗ -0.00002 0.000005∗∗∗ -0.00002 0.000005∗∗∗ -0.00002
(0.000) (0.408) (0.000) (0.409) (0.000) (0.410)
MVE 1w 0.00472∗∗ 0.00857∗∗∗ 0.00477∗∗ 0.00861∗∗∗ 0.00482∗∗ 0.00865∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000)
Acquirer size -0.515∗∗∗ -0.735∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗ -0.737∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗∗ -0.737∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.878 1.308∗∗∗ 0.865 1.299∗∗∗ 0.846 1.275∗∗
(0.192) (0.009) (0.200) (0.009) (0.207) (0.010)
FCF ratio 0.352 1.050 0.357 1.059 0.358 1.070
(0.869) (0.433) (0.867) (0.429) (0.867) (0.424)
ROA -0.605 0.0979 -0.608 0.0929 -0.609 0.0841
(0.688) (0.924) (0.687) (0.928) (0.686) (0.935)
Equity issue number lag -0.768∗∗∗ -0.340 -0.771∗∗∗ -0.342 -0.772∗∗∗ -0.343
(0.001) (0.109) (0.001) (0.107) (0.001) (0.106)
Debt issue number lag -0.0488 0.0203 -0.0483 0.0199 -0.0489 0.0195
(0.569) (0.662) (0.573) (0.668) (0.571) (0.676)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003
(0.593) (0.327) (0.598) (0.329) (0.602) (0.327)
Total debt issue amount lag 0.0001 0.00003 0.0001 0.00003 0.0001 0.00003
(0.127) (0.148) (0.129) (0.146) (0.126) (0.144)
Ownership Concentration 2.910∗∗ 1.726∗∗ 2.915∗∗ 1.727∗∗ 2.929∗∗ 1.735∗∗
(0.028) (0.039) (0.028) (0.039) (0.027) (0.038)
Observations 8868 9378 8868 9378 8868 9378
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.027 0.022 0.027 0.022 0.027
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.15: OLS Regressions: Announcement Effects (3-day event window)
Dependent variable: CAR MAR VW 3day; Independent variable notations and definitions
are listed in Table 1.1. Column (1),(3), and (5) report the regression results for acquisitions
of private targets (Private), while column (2), (4), and (6) report the results for acquisitions
of public targets (Public). Fixed year effect and robust standard errors have been considered
in all models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private Public Private Public Private Public
max Rdeals 0.527∗∗∗ 0.611
(0.009) (0.114)
max Ramount 0.531∗∗∗ 0.542
(0.008) (0.162)
Relationship dummy 0.535∗∗∗ 0.522
(0.006) (0.168)
Multiple 2 -0.265 0.187 -0.266 0.191 -0.266 0.191
(0.152) (0.619) (0.151) (0.612) (0.150) (0.613)
Cash portion -0.00127 0.0238∗∗∗ -0.00127 0.0238∗∗∗ -0.00126 0.0238∗∗∗
(0.418) (0.000) (0.418) (0.000) (0.422) (0.000)
Same industry dummy 0.177 0.525 0.178 0.518 0.179 0.515
(0.294) (0.107) (0.293) (0.111) (0.289) (0.114)
Defense dummy 1.143 -0.740 1.137 -0.740 1.140 -0.743
(0.566) (0.266) (0.570) (0.266) (0.571) (0.264)
Hostile dummy 0.768∗ 1.224 0.787∗ 1.223 0.821∗ 1.230
(0.095) (0.100) (0.088) (0.102) (0.077) (0.101)
Tender offer dummy -0.388 -0.760 -0.388 -0.754 -0.390 -0.748
(0.179) (0.242) (0.179) (0.246) (0.177) (0.250)
Crossborder dummy -0.279 0.112 -0.280 0.114 -0.279 0.106
(0.101) (0.796) (0.100) (0.793) (0.101) (0.807)
Deal size 0.627∗∗∗ -0.611∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ -0.611∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ -0.611∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Nonmissing relative sales dummy 0.167 -0.00659 0.166 -0.00723 0.164 -0.00608
(0.367) (0.991) (0.371) (0.991) (0.376) (0.992)
Inter relative sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.234) (0.268) (0.232) (0.279) (0.229) (0.277)
MVE 1w 0.006∗∗∗ 0.002 0.006∗∗∗ 0.002 0.006∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.000) (0.618) (0.000) (0.625) (0.000) (0.619)
Acquiror size -0.757∗∗∗ 0.126 -0.759∗∗∗ 0.128 -0.760∗∗∗ 0.128
(0.000) (0.369) (0.000) (0.363) (0.000) (0.361)
Leverage 0.960∗∗ 3.044∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗ 3.056∗∗∗ 0.918∗∗ 3.054∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.003) (0.038) (0.003) (0.043) (0.003)
FCF ratio 0.835 -2.683 0.844 -2.692 0.849 -2.690
(0.582) (0.342) (0.579) (0.341) (0.576) (0.341)
ROA -0.725 4.922∗∗ -0.732 4.937∗∗ -0.738 4.935∗∗
(0.486) (0.015) (0.482) (0.015) (0.479) (0.015)
Equity issue number lag -0.611∗∗∗ -0.184 -0.614∗∗∗ -0.188 -0.615∗∗∗ -0.188
(0.000) (0.705) (0.000) (0.699) (0.000) (0.698)
Debt issue number lag 0.012 -0.094 0.012 -0.093 0.012 -0.094
(0.807) (0.476) (0.808) (0.480) (0.806) (0.476)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.000 0.0005 -0.000 0.0005 -0.000 0.0005
(0.909) (0.154) (0.910) (0.158) (0.917) (0.160)
Total debt amount lag 0.00007∗ -0.00002 0.00007∗ -0.00002 0.00007∗ -0.00002
(0.069) (0.553) (0.070) (0.566) (0.070) (0.578)
Ownership Concentration 2.255∗∗∗ 2.949 2.259∗∗∗ 2.949 2.272∗∗∗ 2.966
(0.008) (0.122) (0.008) (0.122) (0.008) (0.120)
Observations 15711 2535 15711 2535 15711 2535
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.062 0.021 0.062 0.021 0.062
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.16: Heckman Probit: Acquisition Decisions (Non-Acquirers vs Acquirers)
Dependent variable for column (1) is DealScan match, which is equal to one if the firm has
a matching record in DealScan and zero otherwise; Dependent variable for column (2)-(5)
is Acquirer Dummy, which is equal to one if the firm conducts any acquisition in that year
and zero otherwise; Independent variable notations and definitions are listed in Table 1.1.
Robust standard errors have been considered in all models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DealScan match Acq Dummy Acq Dummy Acq Dummy Acq Dummy









Size -0.0119 0.358∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage 0.240∗∗∗ -0.0272 -0.0285 -0.0281 -0.0210
(0.000) (0.325) (0.299) (0.312) (0.434)
Debt issuance1 0.000002 0.00004∗∗∗ 0.00004∗∗∗ 0.00004∗∗∗ 0.00004∗∗∗
(0.842) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt issuance3 -0.00001∗∗ -0.00001∗∗ -0.00001∗∗ -0.00001∗∗ -0.00001∗∗
(0.013) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026)
FCF ratio 0.0696 -0.368∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.368∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash ratio -1.526∗∗∗ -1.275∗∗∗ -1.273∗∗∗ -1.275∗∗∗ -1.288∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Revenue growth rate -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.176) (0.274) (0.276) (0.276) (0.265)
Rnd exp 0.0004 -0.0227 -0.0226 -0.0227 -0.0232
(0.798) (0.135) (0.132) (0.136) (0.128)
Selling exp -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.610) (0.335) (0.335) (0.334) (0.334)
ROA 0.164∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangible size 0.147∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MTB -0.0230∗∗∗ 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0313∗∗∗ 0.0311∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Equity issue number lag -0.111∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Debt issue number lag 0.0524 0.0806∗∗∗ 0.0805∗∗∗ 0.0806∗∗∗ 0.0808∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total equity issue amount lag -0.00001 -0.00007∗ -0.00007∗ -0.00007∗ -0.00007∗
(0.488) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.073)
Total debt issue amount lag 0.00003 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001
(0.487) (0.597) (0.599) (0.600) (0.600)
Ownership Concentration -0.710∗∗∗ -0.866∗∗∗ -0.866∗∗∗ -0.866∗∗∗ -0.867∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 64248 64248 64248 64196
rho 0.174 0.174 0.174 0.175
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Chapter 2
Bank Lending Relationships and
Board Structure
2.1 Introduction
Banks have long been regarded as efficient information producers and delegated monitors
on behalf of debt-holders. Through pre-agreed contractual terms, provisions, and covenants
in loan agreements, banks establish multiple mechanisms to monitor and influence firms’
important business decisions. This influence extends beyond issues associated with debt
repayment. For example, Nini et al. (2009) show how loan covenant violations can be used
by banks to enhance corporate governance.
A breach of loan covenants may grant banks immediate legal rights to take an active part
in a firm’s daily operations. Indeed, even without covenant violations, banks can play a role
in the management of the firm via their influence over the firm’s board. A typical loan agree-
ment may include a change-in-control clause that strengthens banks’ rights when there is a
control transfer, which may include alterations in ownership interests, board composition, or
46
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key officers1. Relationship banks may request board representation through the appointment
of bank officers as directors on boards, or may direct a board composition change to increase
board independence to enhance the bank’s monitoring goals. For example, the following ex-
cerpts from loan agreement clauses or syndicated loan amendments illustrate lenders’ ability
to influence the board’s composition:
• SEC filing2; Company: Lowell Mineral Exploration, L.L.C.
“...to provide the Bank with written notice of any change to the composition of the
board of directors of the Borrower; and to request the consent of the Bank by giving
it at least 30 days written notice of any proposed material change to the beneficial
ownership or structure of the Borrower, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld
or delayed.”
• Document ID3 1164204; Clause ID: 18335185; Company: Itec Environmental Group,
Inc
“Effective at the Closing of the Loan, the Company shall appoint Mr. Ronald M.
Domingue4 (or his designee) to the Company’s Board of Directors. For so long as (i)
the Note (or any note issued upon transfer of the Note, in whole or in part) remains
outstanding, or if later (ii) one year from the First Closing Date, the Company shall
nominate Mr. Domingue (or his designee) for election to the Board at any and all
times that the stockholders of the Company take action (whether by meeting or written
consent) to elect members of the Board of Directors and shall use best efforts to secure
1A good example of this is American Apparel received a default notice, which was triggered when the
board dismissed CEO, Dov Charney, on June 18, 2014. The loan agreement states that if the CEO Dove
Charney got replaced or got ousted, the key lender, Lion Capital, has rights to call back the debt. Reports also
mentioned that Lion Capital hired restructuring firm Miller Buckfire to advise American Apparel months





4Mr. Ronald M. Domingue is a managing partner of the lender, Arbor Malone LLC.
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Mr. Domingues (or his designee) election to the Board.”
• Package ID5:152312; Company: Christie/AIX Inc
“Credit was amended to modify certain borrowing provisions and extend the deadline
for appointment or election of an independent director.”
Recognizing its importance to business continuity and long-term development, prior liter-
ature tends to focus on the impact of monitoring benefits and costs over the board structure
as well as the relation between the board structure and the firm values (see Boone et al.
(2007), Linck et al. (2008), and Coles et al. (2008)). Directors with special expertise, es-
pecially financial expertise (e.g. “bankers on boards”), are also found to impact certain
aspects of firm operations, such as funding alternatives and acquisition decisions (see Byrd
and Mizruchi (2005), Burak Güner et al. (2008), and Huang et al. (2014)). However, the
role of a relationship bank in corporate governance may be more extensive than just taking a
seat on the firm’s board. In this paper, I examine how relationship banks impact the board’s
composition. In particular, I find that relationship banks favor bigger boards with a lower
concentration of insiders.
This paper investigates the mechanism of how bank lending relationships impact the
corporate governance of the firm by examining board composition. In order to facilitate
their monitoring duties, banks may ask for board representation (e.g. appointed as an affil-
iated director) or at least request additional seats of independent directors on the board to
enhance the bank’s monitoring goals, leading to a larger board and diluting the impact of
insiders. The empirical evidence shows (after controlling for the firm complexity and other
firm-specific variables) that in the presence of lending relationships, board size increases,
but the proportion of inside directors on the board decreases. However, these results may
5Source: DealScan
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be skewed by endogeneity in that firms that choose to have lending relationships may have
different characteristics than firms without banking relationships. Thus, I utilize a treat-
ment selection model6 to control for the choice to institute a banking relationship using the
firm’s access to public equity and debt market three years in the past as instruments. The
estimated impacts of lending relationships on board structure remain consistent.
I next examine whether the bank-induced governance changes impact firm value. On one
hand, the bank’s enhanced monitoring mechanism may strengthen corporate governance,
thereby benefiting both creditors and shareholders (for example, see Diamond (1984, 1991),
Leland and Pyle (1977), DeLong (1991), Nini et al. (2009), Bharath et al. (2011)). On the
other hand, the larger boards implemented by relationship bank monitors may reduce firm
value through increased costs, such as increasing compensation paid to directors, prolonged
decision making procedures, increased information asymmetries between CEOs and outside
directors (see Burkart et al. (1997)), or hold-up problems (see Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992),
and Puri (1996)). The net effects on firm value of relationship banks’ intervention in corpo-
rate governance remain an empirical issue.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature review
and hypothesis development. Section 2.3 discusses the data sets and descriptive statistics.
Section 2.4 describes estimation model and methodologies and explains the empirical results.
Section 2.5 summarizes the findings.
6The results are consistent using an IV model even given the problem of the binary dependent variable.
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2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
This paper is related to two broad strands of studies, including corporate governance and
relationship banking. I will review both strands in the following section and develop the
hypotheses accordingly.
2.2.1 Literature Review
The board of directors has been of major interest in the field of corporate governance. Re-
search into the structure of the board has mainly focused on issues such as board size and
independence. Utilizing a sample of IPOs, Boone et al. (2007) concluded that firm complex-
ity and the information asymmetry level increase the monitoring needs as well as the number
of directors on board to implement monitoring duties, and that CEOs influences and nego-
tiation power with outside directors determine board composition and independence. Linck
et al. (2008) further complemented the literature by analyzing a more comprehensive sample
and conducting more tests to mitigate the endogeneity problems that are inherent in inter-
relationship in board structure.
Endogeneity concerns plague studies of board structure. Both Hermalin and Weisbach
(2003) and Adams et al. (2008) surveys describe the potential endogeneity concerns that
specific board structure may be chosen in response to the governance issues confronted. The
most conventional solutions to such endogeneity concerns are the adoption of simultaneous-
equation methods with lagged performance as instruments for current performance (see
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988, 2003), Adams et al. (2008), Boone et al. (2007), Linck et al.
(2008), etc.) Other strategies include the introduction of industry fixed effects into the
regression analysis (see Boone et al. (2007) and Linck et al. (2008)), the use of principal
component analyses to capture the commonality of a set of endogenous variables (Linck
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et al. (2008) and Coles et al. (2008)), and the adoption of three-stage least squares (3SLS)
regressions that combine the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions and simultaneous
equation methodologies (see Coles et al. (2008)).
The importance of board structure hinges on the impact of different board structures
on firms’ operations, such as firm performance, CEO compensation, CEO turnover, anti-
takeover policies, and even capital structure decisions. As an overview measure of firm
value, there are many studies examining the relation between firm performance (e.g. To-
bin’s Q) and board structure. Although larger boards are less likely to be manipulated and
thus are assumed to perform better monitoring duties, Lipton and Lipton and Lorsch (1992)
and Jensen (1993) pointed out the agency problem (e.g. free-riders) among directors in the
board may reduce the efficiency of the board operations and Yermack (1996) later conducted
empirical tests to support the arguments. Coles et al. (2008) recognized the non-linear rela-
tionship between Tobin’s Q and the board size, and suggested an optimal board size for each
type of firms. Cheng (2008) also observed a negative relation between the board size and the
variability of firm performance, which is consistent with the proposition that it takes more
compromises to reach consensus, and therefore a larger board leads to less volatility in firm
performance. A general consensus suggests an inverse relationship between board size and
firm value.
In contrast, however, there is no general consensus about the impact of inside directors
on firm performance. Regulators and legislators advocate the independence of the board (a
lower proportion of inside directors), especially after Enron and Worldcom scandals, since
independent boards are assumed to best monitor management, thereby aligning the interests
of agents and shareholders. However, independent boards are only found to add value in
acquisition-related events (see Byrd and Hickman (1992), Brickley et al. (1994), and Cotter
CHAPTER 2. BANK LENDING RELATIONSHIPS AND BOARD STRUCTURE 52
et al. (1997)). Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (1999) report no rela-
tion between the proportion of outside directors on the board and Tobin’s Q. In contrast,
insiders are claimed to withhold more private information and therefore they are more able
to position appropriate strategies when the information asymmetry between insiders and
outsiders are large. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) and Klein (1998) conducted empirical
analyses to reflect the “value-added” of inside directors in corporate governance when the
board is dominated by the outsiders or when the inside information can be utilized in finance
and investment committees, while Coles et al. (2008) found that Tobin’s Q increases with
the fraction of insiders on the board for R&D intensive firms.
In addition to the breakdown of insiders vs. outsiders, researchers have analyzed how
the special expertise of directors is associated with firm operations. For example, firms with
lending bankers on the board tend to have negative impacts on firms’ debt ratios (see Byrd
and Mizruchi (2005)). Moreover, firms with investment bankers on the board have higher
propensities to take acquisitions and, when they conduct acquisitions, obtain higher premi-
ums (see Huang et al. (2014)). Firms with directors with financial expertise were observed to
have more external financing but lower investment- cash flow sensitivities (see Burak Güner
et al. (2008)). Rather than identifying each director’s financial expertise, I investigate how
lending banks influence the composition of boards, thereby impacting overall firm value.
That is, the bank’s influence the board’s composition is broader than simply demanding a
banker’s seat on the board. Instead, the bank can use monitoring as another form of corpo-
rate governance that is manifest in the bank’s intervention in structuring the board.
Monitoring refers to a process of collecting and producing information that helps eco-
nomic agents allocate their limited resources to maximize profits. The monitoring process,
however, is costly and may suffer from a “reliability problem” (see Hirshleifer (1971)) as
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well as may be regarded as a public good (see Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). Campbel and
Kracaw (1980), therefore, proposed that minimum initial wealth endowments will establish a
natural barrier to entry into the market of information so that financial intermediaries func-
tion as delegated monitors and specialized information producers. Leland and Pyle (1977)
and Diamond (1984) also developed theoretical models to show that financial institutions
can maximize their advantages of economies of scale to achieve diversification benefits in the
production of information. Thus, banks engage in corporate governance through monitoring
and production of private information about firm value.
In the course of repeated lending activities, banks enjoy rents from the reusability of
proprietary information; meanwhile, borrowing firms also benefit from such bank monitor-
ing. Early literature in relationship banking mainly focuses on the market perceptions of
the monitoring services provided by banks. For example, James (1987) and Lummer and
McConnell (1989) documented the positive announcement effects on bank loans, especially
the renewals with favorable loan terms. Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), Berger and Udell
(1995, 1996), and Bharath et al. (2011) found that borrowers may also enjoy the benefits
from the reduction of monitoring costs through greater fund availability, better loan terms,
and loose collateral requirements.
Indeed, lending banks can influence their borrowers far more than future lending activ-
ities only, but also other fundamentals, such as the internal monitoring mechanisms and
even daily operations. Bank monitoring takes the form of contractual covenant restrictions,
pre-agreed periodic reviews of material non-public information and corporate governance.
Nini et al. (2009) utilized the incidence of covenant violations to investigate the real effects
of banks’ implementation of the creditor rights and their exercise of monitoring duties to
improve the overall corporate governance level. Nini et al. (2009) documented a series of re-
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versal consequences after the violations of the financial covenants. For example, a decline in
acquisitions and capital expenditure, a sharp reduction in leverage and shareholder payouts,
and an increase in CEO turnover are found to occur immediately after the violations. Also,
they showed that both operating performance and stock market performance improve post-
violation and concluded the positive impact of lenders’ involvement in corporate governance.
Saunders et al. (2012) also studied the consequences of covenant violations and found that
the borrowing firms experience higher default probabilities as well as higher costs of capital
after covenant violations.
Banks may share benefits from the reusability of proprietary information with borrowers,
but they may also pursue their own interests at the expenses of their clients. Theoretically,
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) modeled the hold-up problem describing the ascending costs
associated with expanding market power. Puri (1996) researched the conflicts of interests
embedded in the banking relationships but the empirical findings show that the investors
value the certification services provided more than the costs associated. In this paper, banks
transfer their monitoring costs to the borrowing firms by requesting the enhancement of
corporate governance mechanism. The cost associated with suboptimal governance (e.g.
unwieldy or inefficient boards) is an alternative source of costs associated with the lending
relationships. In this paper, I examine the role of relationship banks in determining the
board’s composition.
2.2.2 Hypotheses
As delegated monitors, banks can utilize their contractual rights obtained from bank loan
covenants in order to impact borrowing firms’ corporate governance. That is, a relationship
bank may either ask for board representation (appointment of an affiliated director) or re-
quest board composition changes (e.g. greater board independence). As a creditor, the bank
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is naturally aligned with debt holders in opposition to equity holders. Moreover, if managers
hold stock or options in the company, they may be more aligned with shareholders. So as to
control the risk shifting and moral hazard incentives of shareholders and managers, banks
and other creditors engage in monitoring activities. These may take the form of board repre-
sentation so as to oversee the impact the operational activities of the board and institutional
shareholders. Thus, I hypothesize that the presence of a relationship bank may shift board
composition so as to reduce the power of management and shareholders in favor of creditors.
Hypothesis Ia: The board size increases if the firm has established a lending
relationship with a bank.
Hypothesis Ib: The percentage of inside directors on the board decreases if the
firm has established a lending relationship with a bank.
These changes in board composition enhance the monitoring capability of the relation-
ship bank by diluting the control of management and institutional shareholders. Conditional
on this realignment of power within the firm in the presence of relationship banks, I next
examine whether the board composition changes increase or decrease firm value. The banks’
role on boards may enhance firm value since they can engage in active corporate governance.
However, the enhanced power of the relationship bank in corporate governance may reduce
firm value by exacerbating the hold-up problem and the debt overhang problem. Therefore,
a banker-controlled board may pass up positive net present value investment projects if they
are perceived as too risky, particularly if the firm’s financial condition is tenuous7. The ques-
tion of whether the positive or negative impacts of bank relationship intervention in board
7The results are consistent if an indicator variable of financial condition, which is equal to one if Altman
Z-score is equal to or greater than three and zero otherwise, is included in all specifications.
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composition dominate is an empirical one. Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis II: The presence of a bank lending relationship and bank-induced
governance reduce firm value.
2.3 Data
Risk Metrics Directors Legacy (previously known as IRRC) collects a range of variables re-
lated to individual board directors for firms in the S&P 1500 index since 1996. Rick Metrics
experienced a structural change in its data collection methodology8 to follow Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) specifications in 2007 and therefore separated its database into
two as Directors Legacy for 1996-2006 and Directors for data since 2007. I manually combine
two databases and make sure that company identities are consistent across two databases9.
Therefore, my sample spans all firms in the database from 1996 through 2011.
Companies are then matched to Computstat in order to obtain the firm-specific variables.
I also use the Compustat Segment track to obtain the number of segments to proxy the scope
and complexity of the firm’s operations. I control for previous mergers and acquisitions by
incorporating the Thomson Securities Data Corporations (SDC Platinum) M&A database.
I categorize firms’ acquisition status to be non-acquirers, episodic acquirers, and serial ac-
quirers based on the number of total acquisitions conducted in the past 3 years (see Fuller
et al. (2002).) A firm is defined as a serial acquirer if it conducts 5 or more acquisitions
8ISS acquired IRRC in 2005 and completed an integration of IRRC databases into ISS databases in 2007.
In addition to company ID changes (different IDs and different CUSIP formats (6 digit vs. 9 digit)), some
new variables were added (e.g. financial expertise indicator), some files were discontinued (e.g. prior services
on board), and some were recorded via different methodologies (e.g. super majority provision in Governance
track was a Yes/No indicator, but new super majority contains actual percentage).
9To be consistent, I only use variables that can be found in both databases and recorded in a similar
manner. I also manually track the company ID based on the company names and the list of directors before
and after 2007 to ensure continuity.
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in a three-year window, as an episodic acquirer if between 1-4, and non-acquirer if zero. In
order to construct two instruments for funding decisions, I obtain the initial years of access
to public equity and public debt market from SDC Platinum Global New Issues database.
I obtain more detailed information about the CEO from Execucomp database, e.g. CEO
tenure, age, and ownership stake. Bank loan data are extracted from Loan Pricing Corpo-
ration (LPC) DealScan database. Using the DealScan Compustat link table provided by
Chava and Roberts (2008), I match the corresponding loan records to matched companies.
Following Bharath et al. (2007), I use the window of past 3 years (excluding the current
year, or (-3, -1)) to define the existence of a prior lending relationship, denoted as Relation-
ship dummy. After excluding financial institutions and utilities, the final sample consists of
10,382 firm years with 1,797 distinct firms. Among the total firm years, 7,293 (3,089) firm
years do (do not) have lending relationships.
Two main measures of board compositions in this paper are board size (denoted as
Board size) and the proportion of inside directors on board (Board inside pct). Risk Met-
rics provides flags of board affiliations for each director, including employee, affiliated, and
independent. Directors who serve as employees to the firm are considered inside directors,
whereas affiliated and independent are both regarded as outside directors (see Lehn et al.
(2009) and Coles et al. (2008)). In exercising their oversight capabilities, banks may require
the appointment of either affiliated directors (bank executives) or independent directors
(non-bank directors). Since banks may have an impact on the number of both affiliated and
independent directors, I use the percentage of inside directors as the major measure of board
composition.
Table 2.2 provides summary statistics for the whole sample. Table 2.2 shows that the
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mean (median) number of directors on board is 8.97 (9) and the mean (median) percentage
of inside directors on board is 20.1% (16.7%). On average, CEOs are aged at 61.59, and have
8.17 years of tenure and 4.94% of ownership. Also, 7.84% of CEOs are elected as chairmen.
The average firm in the sample has 2.07 segments10, age of 32.63 years11, Tobin’s Q of 1.49,
size of 7.27 (equivalent to 1,436.55 million dollars of total assets), free cash flow ratio of
5.11%, R&D expense ratio of 4.83%, selling expense ratio of 26%, ROA of 9.58%, leverage
of 21.8%, and market-to-book ratio of 1.71. All variable definitions and denotations can be
found in Table 2.1.
Table 2.3 divides the full sample into two subgroups: firm years without prior lending
relationships and those with prior lending relationships. Table 2.3 shows that firms with
prior lending relationships have more directors and a smaller percentage of inside directors
on their boards, with the mean differences significant at the 1% level. In addition, firms
with banking relationships tend to have more segments, longer operating years, smaller
CEO ownership, and older CEOs with longer tenures (all means are significantly different
at the 1% level). Firms with prior lending relationships are found to be larger in size, have
lower Tobin’s Q, smaller free cash flow ratios, smaller R&D expense ratios, selling expense
ratios, higher leverage, and smaller market-to-book ratio.
10The number of segments is calculated as the summation of total business segments with non-missing
segment SIC of a firm. Firms who do not report the segment information are recognized as ones with one
segment without any differentiation.
11The firm age is calculated based on the founding dates provided by IPO data from Jay R. Ritters website.
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2.4 Estimation Models and Empirical Results
2.4.1 Determinants of Board Compositions
To test the first set hypotheses about determinants of board structure, I perform the ordinary
least square regressions on board size and the proportion of inside directors separately as
follows:
Board size = α ∗Relationship dummy + β ∗XCEO + γ ∗XFirm + ε (2.1)
Board inside pct = α ∗Relationship dummy + β ∗XCEO + γ ∗XFirm + ε (2.2)
CEO related variables (XCEO) include CEO ownership (CEO Own), CEO age (CEO Age),
CEO tenure (CEO Tenure) and an indicator if the CEO and chairman position are joined
(CEO Duality). Intuitively, CEOs have incentives to utilize their influences and bargaining
power to affect the board structure (see Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003) and Boone
et al. (2007)). Thus, CEO related variables are included in Equation (2.1) and (2.2) as a
control for CEO’s negotiation power over the board composition.
Firm related variables (XFirm) include the number of prior acquisitions/ prior acquirer
status (L.Total Mergers 3yrs represents the number of acquisitions in the past three years or
L.Acquirer status f identifies the status of acquirers to be non-acquirer, episodic acquirer, or
serial acquirer), the number of segments (Seg total), the firm age since operations (Firm age),
the natural logarithm of total assets (Size), free cash flow ratio (FCF ratio), research and
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development expense ratio (Rnd exp), selling expense ratio (Selling exp), return on asset
(ROA), leverage (Leverage), and market-to-book ratio (MTB). The prior acquisition status,
the number of segments, the firm age and the firm size represent the scope and the complex-
ity of firm operations, which increases the need for broader consultancy and a bigger board
(see Boone et al. (2007) and Coles et al. (2008)). Free cash flow ratio captures the extent
that CEOs might be able to expropriate for private benefits (see Jensen (1986)) and thus
the need for professional monitoring. The relative portion of R&D expenditure represents
the level of expertise in the professions and the costs of monitoring to the outside directors,
while the ratio of selling expenses measures the market competition and serves as the oppo-
site effects to R&D expenses. Returns on assets proxy for firms’ profitability and leverage
serves as a control for firms’ current funding status. Market-to-book ratio projects firms’
growth opportunities as well as the monitoring costs from the perspective of outside directors.
Table 2.4 column (1) and (2) demonstrate the regression results for Equation (2.1). The
positive coefficients on the Relationship dummy imply that the presence of prior lending
relationship increases the board size (positive coefficient significant at the 5% level). Mean-
while, CEO age is positively correlated with the board size, which is consistent with the
phenomenon found by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) that when CEOs age and near their
retirement, the board size tends to expand to include potential successor candidates. The
negative coefficients of CEO tenure and CEO duality in the analysis of board size reveal that
the larger the impact of CEOs, the more condensed the board. Also, positive and statis-
tically significant coefficients on the number of segments, firm age, and firm size reconfirm
that larger, more complex firms require larger boards to provide advice and oversight (see
Boone et al. (2007)). Consistent with the conjectures about the monitoring costs, both R&D
expenditure and market-to-book ratio are associated with more condensed boards, while sell-
ing expenditure is positively correlated with the number of directors on board.
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Table 2.5 column (1) and (2) present the results for analysis of the proportion of inside
directors. The findings show that the presence of prior lending relationships leads to lower
percentages of inside directors on board (negative coefficient significant at the 1% level).
CEOs influence the composition of the board structure towards the insiders via their owner-
ship and tenure, lending support to negotiation hypotheses that the board composition is the
outcome of negotiations between CEOs and outside directors (see Hermalin and Weisbach
(1998) and Boone et al. (2007)). The empirical results also show that firms tend to reduce
the proportion of inside directors on board as they age, expand in size, and become more
levered. The market-to-book ratio, however, represents potential growth opportunities as
well as the monitoring costs to outsiders and thus increases the proportion of inside directors.
There are two dimensions of potential endogeneity concerns associated with the OLS
cross-sectional analyses. First, board composition itself may be jointly determined. To con-
trol for such joint-endogeneity problems, I control for the proportion of inside directors in
the analysis of board size, and control for the board size in the analysis of the proportion of
inside directors (see Coles et al. (2008)). Furthermore, the year and industry fixed effects are
included in all specifications and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Alterna-
tively, I consider the timing of joint-endogeneity concern and follow Hermalin and Weisbach
(1991) and Coles et al. (2008) to use the lagged values of board size and the proportion of
inside directors in each others’ regressions. Corresponding results are reported in column
(3)- (6) in Table 2.4 and 2.5. Results are all consistent with OLS results presented in column
(1) and (2) of Table 2.4 and 2.5.
The second dimension of endogeneity concern involves the decision to establish a bank
lending relationships itself. Therefore, I estimate a two-stage treatment selection model to
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address this endogeneity concern. In the first stage, I conduct a probit regression with a
dummy dependent variable to identify the decision to have a bank lending relationship. The
instruments, or exogenous variables to identify the lending decisions, are the firm’s access to
public equity markets and to public debt markets three years prior to the firm year analyzed
(t-3). The rationale for constructing an instrument endogenous bank relationships using
the firm’s access to public equity market and debt market in the past three years is that,
firms’ previous funding capabilities in the public debt and equity markets may affect their
decisions to establish lending relationships with banks in the syndication market, but do not
necessarily impact the current board composition directly. In the second stage, I run the
OLS regressions of the board composition (board size or the proportion of inside directors)
over the predicted value of lending relationships from the first stage.
Table 2.6 reports the results of two-stage treatment selection regressions for the board
size and Table 2.7 presents the results for the proportion of inside directors, respectively.
Both tests confirm OLS results, showing a positive impact over the board size and negative
impact over the proportion of inside directors in the presence of a banking relationship. Ta-
bles 2.6 and 2.7 also present the first stage probit regressions in columns (2), (4), and (6).
When a firm has prior access to public equity market, it is significantly (at the 5% level or
better) less likely to establish a bank lending relationship. However, prior access to public
debt significantly (at 1% level) increases the likelihood of a bank lending relationship. The
signs and significance levels for other control variables are all consistent with prior tests on
the board size and the proportion of inside directors respectively.
A further test to address the simultaneity in board composition measure is found in Ta-
ble 2.8, which presents the results of an estimation of a system of two seemingly unrelated
regression equations (SURE). The model can be presented in the following equations:
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
Board size = α1 ∗Relationship dummy + β1 ∗XCEO + γ1 ∗XFirm + ε1
Board inside pct = α2 ∗Relationship dummy + β2 ∗XCEO + γ2 ∗XFirm + ε2
The empirical results of SURE system mentioned above are presented in column (1) Ta-
ble 2.8. Furthermore, I conduct three stage least square estimation (3SLS), which combines
two stage least square (2SLS) and seemingly unrelated regression equations, to include lagged
value of the board size and the percentage of insiders in each other’s equation to control for
joint-endogeneity concern. 3SLS estimations are presented in column (2) Table 2.8. Both
models in Table 2.8 confirm the positive size effect and the negative insider percentage effect
of the presence of prior lending relationships.
2.4.2 Firm Value and Lending Relationships
In this section, I test Hypothesis II, which investigates the impact of relationship banks and
board structure on Tobin’s Q. I expand the 3SLS model described in the prior section to
include the firm value, proxied by Tobin’s Q. The fundamental structure of the model can
be presented as follows:

Tobin′s Q = α1XBoard structure + β1Relationship dummy + δ1XCEO + η1XFirm + ε1
Board size = α2XBoard structure,t−1 + β2Relationship dummy + δ2XCEO + η2XFirm + ε2
Board inside pct = α3XBoard structure,t−1 + β3Relationship dummy + δ3XCEO + η3XFirm + ε3
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XBoard structure in Tobin’s Q equation refers to the contemporary value of the board size
and the percentage of inside directors. On the other hand, XBoard structure,t−1 in Board size
represents the lagged value of the percentage of inside directors, while XBoard structure,t−1 in
Board inside director percentage equation represents the lagged value of the board size.
Table 2.9 provides the results for 3SLS estimations mentioned above. The results are
consistent with the general consensus in the literature that Tobin’s Q decreases in board size
(see Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993)), Yermack (1996) and Coles et al. (2008)). It
is interesting to note that Tobin’s Q significantly increases in the percentage of inside direc-
tors after controlling for the presence of lending relationships and joint-endogeneity. Though
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) and Klein (1998) also documented positive contribution of in-
siders, their results are not comprehensive but subject to certain circumstances. Rosenstein
and Wyatt (1997) found positive inside director appointment announcement effects only
when insiders ownerships are between 5% and 25%, but the positive announcement effects
went away when insiders ownerships are more than 25%. Klein (1998) found little associa-
tion between firm performance and overall board composition, but positive relation between
the percentage of inside directors on finance and investment committees and accounting and
stock market performance measures. However, the positive relation between Tobin’s Q and
the percentage of insiders in Table 2.9 prevails in the full sample without special conditions.
Results suggest, therefore, that relationship banks use their influence over the board to pre-
vent insiders from entrenchment by diluting insiders power and expanding board size, while
at the same time utilizing insiders private information to add value, thereby resolving the
controversy in the literature about the connection between the board independence and firm
value.
On the other hand, the presence of lending relationships is found to have a negative im-
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pact on Tobin’s Q. The negative coefficients in Relationship dummy imply that the hold-up
problems outweigh the monitoring benefits and certification services provided by banks. The
most likely explanation rests in the nature of the firms in my sample, which is comprised of
firms in the S&P 1500 index. Therefore, the firms are large, informationally transparent with
relatively well-established board structures. The role of the bank monitor is most evident
for smaller, informationally opaque firms. Thus, after controlling for the board size and the
percentage of insiders, banks’ intervention in management brings more costs than benefits
to the borrowing firms.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003) pointed out that another potential endogeneity issue
that the firm performance may affect the board composition and the board size. For exam-
ple, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggested that the poor performance leads to increases in
board independence. The same concept may apply to the relation between the performance
and the board size. To deal with the potential mutual influence concerns, I include the lagged
value of Tobin’s Q in both board size and the percentage of inside directors equations and
present the results in Table 2.10. The results are all consistent with the findings in Table 2.9.
Coles et al. (2008) found a U-shaped relation and board size. To control for such non-
linearity, I include both the squared term of the board size (denoted as Size sq) and the
percentage of inside directors (or Inside sq) in Table 2.11. Consistent with Coles et al. (2008),
the coefficients on the squared terms in Table 2.11, column (1) are statistically significant
(at the 1% level), indicating a non-linear relation between Tobin’s Q and board size and
between Tobin’s Q and the percentage of inside directors. Results shown in Table 2.11 also
indicate the negative relationship between board size and lending relationships, as well as
the positive effect of insider percentage, presented in Table 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8.
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2.5 Conclusion
As delegated monitors, banks are granted various legal and contractual powers to monitor
and intervene in the borrowing firms’ daily operations. Lending banks may attempt to ac-
tively enhance the firm’s corporate governance in the course of pursuing their monitoring
duties. Several venues can be adopted to enhance one firm’s overall corporate governance.
For example, banks may ask for board representation (appointment of an affiliated director)
or simply board composition changes (e.g. greater board independence), affecting both the
board size and the percentage of inside directors.
Utilizing board information obtained from RiskMetrics and syndicated bank loan data
obtained from LPC DealScan, I find that the presence of lending relationships increases the
board size but reduces the percentage of inside directors. The results are consistent across
different model specifications dealing with joint endogeneity and simultaneity concerns.
Bank monitoring is costly, however, in terms of the cost of financing and potential hold-
up problems. The presence of lending relationships is found to have a negative impact on
firm value, implying that monitoring costs outweigh the governance benefits and certification
services provided by lending banks. In particular, I find that the diluted participation of
insider directors (via larger board size and a lower percentage of insiders) reduces firm value
in the presence of bank lending relationships.
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Table 2.1: Variable Notations and Definitions
Variable Notation Definition
Main Variables
Board size Total number of directors on board.
Board inside pct The percentage of inside directors on board.
Board aff pct The percentage of affiliated directors on board.
Board indep pct The percentage of independent directors on board.
Relationship dummy Dummy variable=1 if the acquirer has established lending relationships
with any banks in the past three years (-3,-1).
Tobin’s Q The ratio of market value of the company over the replacement value of
the company.
XCEO
CEO Own CEO ownership stake in outstanding common stocks.
CEO Age CEO age.
CEO Tenure CEO tenure in CEO position.
CEO Duality An indicator if the CEO and chairman position are joined.
XFirm
Total Mergers 3yrs Total number of mergers the firm conducts in the past three years, in-
cluding the contemporary year (-2,0).
L.Total Mergers 3yrs Total number of mergers the firm conducts in the past three years, ex-
cluding contemporary year (-3,-1).
Acquirer status f The acquirer status indicator, 1=non acquirer, 2-episodic acquirer (who
conduct 1-4 acquisition in the past 3 years), and 3= serial acquirers (who
conduct 5 or more acquisitions in the past three years).
L.Acquirer status f The acquirer status indicator in the previous period, 1=non acquirer, 2-
episodic acquirer (who conduct 1-4 acquisition in the past 3 years), and
3= serial acquirers (who conduct 5 or more acquisitions in the past three
years).
Seg total The number of segments, which is equal to the summation of total busi-
ness segments with non-missing segment SIC of a firm.
Firm age The firm age, which is calculated based on the founding dates provided
by IPO data from Jay R. Ritters website.
Size Natural logarithm of total assets
FCF ratio Scaled free cash flow by total assets
Rnd exp Scaled research and development expenses by sales
Selling exp Scaled selling, general and administrative expenditures by sales
ROA Return on Assets, or the ratio of EBIT over total assets
Leverage The ratio of debt (both long term and short term portion) over total
assets
MTB Market to book ratio, or the ratio of market over book value of total
assets
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics- All
Obs Mean SD Min 25th Perc. Median 75th Perc. Max
Board size 10382 8.969 2.327 3 7 9 10 21
Board inside pct 10382 0.201 0.107 0.0476 0.125 0.167 0.250 0.727
Board aff pct 10382 0.118 0.133 0 0 0.100 0.200 0.800
Board indep pct 10382 0.681 0.170 0 0.571 0.714 0.818 0.938
Seg total 10382 2.071 1.360 1 1 2 3 10
Firm age 10382 32.63 20.05 1 19 29 39 151
CEO Own 10382 4.935 11.07 0 0 1.600 3.700 100
CEO Age 10382 61.59 8.482 31 55 62 67 95
CEO Tenure 10382 8.166 7.830 0 3 6 11 60
CEO Duality 10382 0.0784 0.269 0 0 0 0 1
Total Mergers 3yrs 10382 3.078 4.646 0 0 2 4 130
L.Total Mergers 3yrs 10382 3.159 4.867 0 0 2 4 130
Acquirer status f 10382 1.941 0.701 1 1 2 2 3
L.Acquirer status f 10382 1.945 0.709 1 1 2 2 3
Relationship dummy 10382 0.702 0.457 0 0 1 1 1
Tobin’s Q 10382 1.487 1.486 0.00255 0.626 1.056 1.807 34.06
Size 10382 7.266 1.371 2.819 6.309 7.116 8.060 13.59
FCF ratio 10382 0.0511 0.0907 -1.150 0.00898 0.0524 0.0977 0.779
Rnd exp 10382 0.0483 0.209 0 0 0.00371 0.0502 17.44
Selling exp 10382 0.260 0.372 0.000925 0.120 0.219 0.344 27.27
ROA 10382 0.0958 0.106 -1.528 0.0535 0.0955 0.144 0.909
Leverage 10382 0.218 0.180 0 0.0556 0.210 0.330 1.743
MTB 10382 1.706 1.438 0.0110 0.897 1.281 1.976 34.06
N 10382
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Table 2.4: OLS Regression of Board Size
Dependent variable: Board size; Independent variable notations and definitions are provided
in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year and industry fixed effects
have been considered in all models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Board size Board size Board size Board size Board size Board size
Relationship dummy 0.154∗∗ 0.152∗∗ 0.130∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.130∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037) (0.039)
Board inside pct -1.899∗∗∗ -1.907∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
L.Board inside pct -1.576∗∗∗ -1.582∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
L.Total Mergers 3yrs -0.0100 -0.00909 -0.00936
(0.226) (0.273) (0.260)
L.Acquirer status f -0.0183 -0.0116 -0.0120
(0.727) (0.822) (0.816)
CEO Own -0.00671 -0.00675 -0.00312 -0.00315 -0.00355 -0.00357
(0.106) (0.105) (0.448) (0.446) (0.390) (0.388)
CEO Age 0.0253∗∗∗ 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0250∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Tenure -0.0177∗∗∗ -0.0178∗∗∗ -0.0135∗∗ -0.0136∗∗ -0.0145∗∗ -0.0145∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.037) (0.036) (0.026) (0.025)
CEO Duality -0.532∗∗∗ -0.532∗∗∗ -0.551∗∗∗ -0.551∗∗∗ -0.552∗∗∗ -0.553∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Seg total 0.0967∗∗∗ 0.0945∗∗∗ 0.0949∗∗∗ 0.0927∗∗∗ 0.0961∗∗∗ 0.0937∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm age 0.00737∗∗∗ 0.00743∗∗∗ 0.00689∗∗∗ 0.00694∗∗∗ 0.00698∗∗∗ 0.00703∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Size 0.806∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FCF ratio -0.0485 -0.0602 -0.173 -0.185 -0.162 -0.174
(0.897) (0.873) (0.641) (0.618) (0.664) (0.640)
Rnd exp -1.663∗∗∗ -1.655∗∗∗ -1.631∗∗∗ -1.624∗∗∗ -1.636∗∗∗ -1.629∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Selling exp 1.010∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 1.305∗∗∗ 1.314∗∗∗ 1.373∗∗∗ 1.383∗∗∗ 1.375∗∗∗ 1.384∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -0.00794 -0.0140 -0.0611 -0.0678 -0.0645 -0.0714
(0.971) (0.949) (0.781) (0.758) (0.769) (0.745)
MTB -0.107∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10382 10382 10382 10382 10382 10382
adj. R2 0.400 0.400 0.406 0.406 0.404 0.404
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: OLS Regression of Proportion of Inside Directors on Board
Dependent variable: Board inside pct; Independent variable notations and definitions are
provided in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year and industry
fixed effects have been considered in all models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Board inside pct Board inside pct Board inside pct Board inside pct Board inside pct Board inside pct
Relationship dummy -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0116∗∗∗ -0.0117∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Board size -0.00520∗∗∗ -0.00522∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
L.Board size -0.00421∗∗∗ -0.00423∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
L.Total Mergers 3yrs 0.000489 0.000437 0.000450
(0.146) (0.197) (0.182)
L.Acquirer status f 0.00349 0.00340 0.00342
(0.178) (0.185) (0.183)
CEO Own 0.00189∗∗∗ 0.00189∗∗∗ 0.00185∗∗∗ 0.00185∗∗∗ 0.00187∗∗∗ 0.00187∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Age -0.000115 -0.000114 0.0000172 0.0000184 -0.0000108 -0.00000977
(0.734) (0.735) (0.959) (0.956) (0.974) (0.977)
CEO Tenure 0.00223∗∗∗ 0.00223∗∗∗ 0.00214∗∗∗ 0.00213∗∗∗ 0.00215∗∗∗ 0.00214∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Duality -0.0100∗∗∗ -0.00997∗∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0117∗∗∗ -0.0117∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Seg total -0.000905 -0.000936 -0.000403 -0.000443 -0.000469 -0.000507
(0.544) (0.531) (0.788) (0.767) (0.753) (0.735)
Firm age -0.000252∗∗ -0.000252∗∗ -0.000214∗∗ -0.000214∗∗ -0.000217∗∗ -0.000217∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Size -0.00957∗∗∗ -0.00958∗∗∗ -0.00538∗∗∗ -0.00542∗∗∗ -0.00613∗∗∗ -0.00615∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001)
FCF ratio -0.0655∗∗∗ -0.0655∗∗∗ -0.0658∗∗∗ -0.0658∗∗∗ -0.0643∗∗∗ -0.0644∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rnd exp 0.0168 0.0164 0.00819 0.00774 0.00923 0.00877
(0.391) (0.404) (0.664) (0.681) (0.628) (0.645)
Selling exp -0.0128 -0.0125 -0.00755 -0.00724 -0.00824 -0.00792
(0.313) (0.324) (0.533) (0.549) (0.501) (0.517)
ROA 0.0359∗ 0.0358∗ 0.0426∗∗ 0.0427∗∗ 0.0400∗∗ 0.0400∗∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.034) (0.033) (0.046) (0.045)
Leverage -0.0280∗∗ -0.0282∗∗ -0.0280∗∗ -0.0283∗∗ -0.0281∗∗ -0.0283∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
MTB 0.00256∗∗ 0.00261∗∗ 0.00200 0.00205 0.00202 0.00207∗
(0.043) (0.038) (0.112) (0.103) (0.108) (0.099)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10382 10382 10382 10382 10382 10382
adj. R2 0.220 0.220 0.228 0.228 0.225 0.225
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Two-stage Treatment Selection Model for Board Size
Each set of model includes two stages of regressions, including one (second stage) with
Board size as the dependent variable and one (first stage) with Relationship dummy as the
dependent variable. Independent variable notations and definitions are provided in Table 2.1.
Year and industry fixed effects have been considered in all models.
(1) (2) (3)
Board size Relationship dummy Board size Relationship dummy Board size Relationship dummy
Relationship dummy 1.658∗∗∗ 1.564∗∗∗ 1.552∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Access to Equity Dum l3 -0.0833∗∗∗ -0.0714∗∗ -0.0707∗∗
(0.007) (0.021) (0.022)
Access to Debt Dum l3 0.147∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Board inside pct -1.563∗∗∗ -0.746∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
L.Board inside pct -1.240∗∗∗ -0.758∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
L.Acquirer status f -0.0580∗ 0.0914∗∗∗ -0.0506 0.0923∗∗∗ -0.0508 0.0926∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.000) (0.103) (0.000) (0.102) (0.000)
CEO Own -0.00590∗∗∗ -0.00234∗ -0.00299 -0.000966 -0.00347∗ -0.000853
(0.002) (0.099) (0.122) (0.505) (0.073) (0.556)
CEO Age 0.0254∗∗∗ -0.00301 0.0252∗∗∗ -0.00297 0.0251∗∗∗ -0.00307
(0.000) (0.167) (0.000) (0.173) (0.000) (0.159)
CEO Tenure -0.0145∗∗∗ -0.00433∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗ -0.00266 -0.0121∗∗∗ -0.00278
(0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.233) (0.000) (0.211)
CEO Duality -0.542∗∗∗ 0.0377 -0.557∗∗∗ 0.0302 -0.557∗∗∗ 0.0275
(0.000) (0.481) (0.000) (0.572) (0.000) (0.608)
Seg total 0.0729∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0725∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.0736∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.006)
Firm age 0.00652∗∗∗ 0.000790 0.00616∗∗∗ 0.000565 0.00626∗∗∗ 0.000561
(0.000) (0.322) (0.000) (0.480) (0.000) (0.482)
Size 0.716∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FCF ratio 0.0405 -0.235 -0.0674 -0.287 -0.0555 -0.292
(0.888) (0.284) (0.814) (0.193) (0.846) (0.185)
Rnd exp -1.419∗∗∗ -2.078∗∗∗ -1.406∗∗∗ -2.072∗∗∗ -1.413∗∗∗ -2.072∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Selling exp 0.984∗∗∗ -0.470∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ -0.495∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.993∗∗∗ -0.321 1.065∗∗∗ -0.298 1.067∗∗∗ -0.291
(0.000) (0.135) (0.000) (0.165) (0.000) (0.176)
Leverage -0.721∗∗∗ 1.510∗∗∗ -0.731∗∗∗ 1.482∗∗∗ -0.725∗∗∗ 1.475∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MTB -0.0572∗∗∗ -0.0483∗∗∗ -0.0556∗∗∗ -0.0463∗∗∗ -0.0572∗∗∗ -0.0463∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10374 10374 10374
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.7: Two-stage Treatment Selection Model for Proportion of Inside Directors on Board
Each set of model includes two stages of regressions, including one (second stage) with
Board inside pct as the dependent variable and one (first stage) with Relationship dummy
as the dependent variable. Independent variable notations and definitions are provided in
Table 2.1. Year and industry fixed effects have been considered in all models.
(1) (2) (3)
Board inside pct Relationship dummy Board inside pct Relationship dummy Board inside pct Relationship dummy
Relationship dummy -0.0370∗∗∗ -0.0297∗∗ -0.0297∗∗
(0.002) (0.013) (0.013)
Access to Equity Dum l3 -0.0833∗∗∗ -0.0765∗∗ -0.0792∗∗
(0.007) (0.014) (0.011)
Access to Debt Dum l3 0.147∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Board size -0.00509∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗
(0.000) (0.029)
L.Board size -0.00413∗∗∗ 0.0102
(0.000) (0.194)
L.Acquirer status f 0.00417∗∗∗ 0.0914∗∗∗ 0.00390∗∗ 0.0918∗∗∗ 0.00392∗∗ 0.0917∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000)
CEO Own 0.00187∗∗∗ -0.00234∗ 0.00184∗∗∗ -0.00223 0.00186∗∗∗ -0.00229
(0.000) (0.099) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.106)
CEO Age -0.000115 -0.00301 0.0000142 -0.00344 -0.0000130 -0.00326
(0.425) (0.167) (0.921) (0.116) (0.928) (0.137)
CEO Tenure 0.00217∗∗∗ -0.00433∗∗ 0.00210∗∗∗ -0.00402∗ 0.00211∗∗∗ -0.00413∗
(0.000) (0.049) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000) (0.061)
CEO Duality -0.00978∗∗∗ 0.0377 -0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0463 -0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0418
(0.005) (0.481) (0.000) (0.387) (0.001) (0.435)
Seg total -0.000601 0.0328∗∗∗ -0.000215 0.0311∗∗∗ -0.000280 0.0318∗∗∗
(0.440) (0.006) (0.781) (0.010) (0.718) (0.008)
Firm age -0.000239∗∗∗ 0.000790 -0.000206∗∗∗ 0.000670 -0.000208∗∗∗ 0.000709
(0.000) (0.322) (0.000) (0.402) (0.000) (0.375)
Size -0.00826∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ -0.00456∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ -0.00528∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FCF ratio -0.0674∗∗∗ -0.235 -0.0673∗∗∗ -0.235 -0.0658∗∗∗ -0.237
(0.000) (0.284) (0.000) (0.285) (0.000) (0.280)
Rnd exp 0.0124 -2.078∗∗∗ 0.00497 -2.018∗∗∗ 0.00598 -2.040∗∗∗
(0.272) (0.000) (0.657) (0.000) (0.594) (0.000)
Selling exp -0.0121∗ -0.470∗∗∗ -0.00705 -0.487∗∗∗ -0.00771 -0.480∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.231) (0.000)
ROA 0.0411∗∗∗ -0.321 0.0464∗∗∗ -0.331 0.0437∗∗∗ -0.324
(0.002) (0.135) (0.001) (0.122) (0.001) (0.132)
Leverage -0.0166∗∗ 1.510∗∗∗ -0.0198∗∗ 1.509∗∗∗ -0.0199∗∗ 1.510∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000)
MTB 0.00178∗∗ -0.0483∗∗∗ 0.00145 -0.0469∗∗∗ 0.00148∗ -0.0473∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.000) (0.101) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10374 10374 10374
R2
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations (SURE) and Three-stage Least
Squares (3SLS)
Two equations, one with Board size as the dependent variable and one with Board inside pct
as the dependent variable, are included in both SURE and 3SLS models. Independent
variable notations and definitions are provided in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and year and industry fixed effects have been considered in all models.
(1) (2)
SURE 3SLS
Board size Board inside pct Board size Board inside pct
L.Board size -0.00598∗∗∗
(0.000)
L.Board inside pct -2.207∗∗∗
(0.000)
Relationship dummy 0.152∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ -0.0117∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
L.Acquirer status f -0.0183 0.00349∗∗ -0.00958 0.00340∗∗
(0.529) (0.021) (0.740) (0.025)
CEO Own -0.00675∗∗∗ 0.00189∗∗∗ -0.00232 0.00186∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.208) (0.000)
CEO Age 0.0254∗∗∗ -0.000114 0.0248∗∗∗ 0.0000336
(0.000) (0.426) (0.000) (0.815)
CEO Tenure -0.0178∗∗∗ 0.00223∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗ 0.00211∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Duality -0.532∗∗∗ -0.00997∗∗∗ -0.561∗∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
Seg total 0.0945∗∗∗ -0.000936 0.0934∗∗∗ -0.000328
(0.000) (0.216) (0.000) (0.663)
Firm age 0.00743∗∗∗ -0.000252∗∗∗ 0.00688∗∗∗ -0.000202∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.796∗∗∗ -0.00958∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗ -0.00473∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FCF ratio -0.0602 -0.0655∗∗∗ -0.219 -0.0639∗∗∗
(0.825) (0.000) (0.419) (0.000)
Rnd exp -1.655∗∗∗ 0.0164 -1.618∗∗∗ 0.00561
(0.000) (0.138) (0.000) (0.611)
Selling exp 1.005∗∗∗ -0.0125∗ 0.970∗∗∗ -0.00603
(0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.347)
ROA 1.314∗∗∗ 0.0358∗∗∗ 1.412∗∗∗ 0.0417∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.002)
Leverage -0.0140 -0.0282∗∗∗ -0.0941 -0.0284∗∗∗
(0.904) (0.000) (0.417) (0.000)
MTB -0.108∗∗∗ 0.00261∗∗∗ -0.102∗∗∗ 0.00185∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.021)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10382 10382
R2 0.405 0.226 0.408 0.231
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.9: Three-stage Least Squares (3SLS) with Tobin’s Q
Three equations are included in 3SLS model and dependent variables for three equations are
Tobin’s Q, Board size and Board inside pct respectively.Independent variable notations and
definitions are provided in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year
and industry fixed effects have been considered in the model.
(1)





Board inside pct 0.270∗
(0.064)
L.Board inside pct -2.263∗∗∗
(0.000)
Relationship dummy -0.246∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ -0.0122∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
L.Acquirer status f -0.0594∗∗∗ -0.00348 0.00329∗∗
(0.001) (0.904) (0.030)
CEO Own -0.0000115 -0.00231 0.00186∗∗∗
(0.992) (0.210) (0.000)
CEO Age -0.00975∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗ 0.0000159
(0.000) (0.000) (0.912)
CEO Tenure 0.00622∗∗∗ -0.0140∗∗∗ 0.00212∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Duality -0.101∗∗ -0.555∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.000) (0.000)
Seg total -0.0765∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ -0.000467
(0.000) (0.000) (0.535)
Firm age -0.00494∗∗∗ 0.00744∗∗∗ -0.000211∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.164∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ -0.00442∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FCF ratio 0.779∗∗∗ -0.302 -0.0624∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.266) (0.000)
Rnd exp -0.372∗∗∗ -1.593∗∗∗ 0.00488
(0.006) (0.000) (0.658)
Selling exp 1.043∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ -0.00408
(0.000) (0.000) (0.521)
ROA 5.841∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.0525∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Leverage -1.762∗∗∗ -0.0170 -0.0298∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.883) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
N 10382
R2 0.398 0.406 0.230
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.10: Three-stage Least Squares (3SLS) with Tobin’s Q- controlling for lagged Tobin’s
Q
Three equations are included in 3SLS model and dependent variables for three equations are
Tobin’s Q, Board size and Board inside pct respectively.Independent variable notations and
definitions are provided in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year
and industry fixed effects have been considered in the model.
(1)
Tobin’s Q Board size Board inside pct






Board inside pct 0.848∗∗∗
(0.000)
L.Board inside pct -2.131∗∗∗
(0.000)
Relationship dummy -0.236∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗ -0.0109∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
L.Acquirer status f -0.0617∗∗∗ -0.00714 0.00337∗∗
(0.001) (0.805) (0.026)
CEO Own -0.00123 -0.00246 0.00186∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.182) (0.000)
CEO Age -0.00919∗∗∗ 0.0238∗∗∗ 0.0000754
(0.000) (0.000) (0.599)
CEO Tenure 0.00459∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗ 0.00209∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Duality -0.104∗∗ -0.549∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.000) (0.000)
Seg total -0.0740∗∗∗ 0.0909∗∗∗ -0.000157
(0.000) (0.000) (0.835)
Firm age -0.00464∗∗∗ 0.00655∗∗∗ -0.000185∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.184∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ -0.00519∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FCF ratio 0.813∗∗∗ -0.297 -0.0623∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.273) (0.000)
Rnd exp -0.411∗∗∗ -1.548∗∗∗ 0.00412
(0.003) (0.000) (0.708)
Selling exp 1.065∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗ -0.00700
(0.000) (0.000) (0.272)
ROA 5.823∗∗∗ 1.492∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.016)
Leverage -1.743∗∗∗ -0.202∗ -0.0238∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.083) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
N 10381
R2 0.394 0.408 0.232
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.11: Three-stage Least Squares (3SLS) with Tobin’s Q- controlling for non-linearity
of board size and insider percentage
Three equations are included in 3SLS model and dependent variables for three equations are
Tobin’s Q, Board size and Board inside pct respectively.Independent variable notations and
definitions are provided in Table 2.1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and year
and industry fixed effects have been considered in the model.
(1)
Tobin’s Q Board size Board inside pct








Board inside pct 4.975∗∗∗
(0.000)




Relationship dummy -0.161∗∗∗ 0.0998∗∗ -0.0108∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.019) (0.000)
L.Acquirer status f -0.0640∗∗∗ -0.00790 0.00338∗∗
(0.001) (0.785) (0.025)
CEO Own -0.00103 -0.00253 0.00186∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.169) (0.000)
CEO Age -0.00441∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0000748
(0.022) (0.000) (0.602)
CEO Tenure -0.00164 -0.0130∗∗∗ 0.00209∗∗∗
(0.412) (0.000) (0.000)
CEO Duality -0.167∗∗∗ -0.548∗∗∗ -0.0125∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Seg total -0.0672∗∗∗ 0.0890∗∗∗ -0.000157
(0.000) (0.000) (0.835)
Firm age -0.00357∗∗∗ 0.00640∗∗∗ -0.000185∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size 0.229∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ -0.00533∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FCF ratio 0.876∗∗∗ -0.295 -0.0624∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.277) (0.000)
Rnd exp -0.393∗∗∗ -1.541∗∗∗ 0.00432
(0.007) (0.000) (0.695)
Selling exp 0.999∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ -0.00726
(0.000) (0.000) (0.254)
ROA 5.990∗∗∗ 1.606∗∗∗ 0.0298∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.020)
Leverage -1.595∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗ -0.0235∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.045) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
N 10381
R2 0.292 0.407 0.232
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Chapter 3
Bank Monitoring and Managerial
Procrastination: Evidence from the
Timing of Earnings Announcements
3.1 Introduction
Banks have long been perceived as efficient monitors because of their expertise developed
through the receipt of privation information over the course of long term lending relation-
ships. As relationship lenders, banks are granted contractual and legal rights to enable them
to perform their monitoring duties and restructure loans whenever necessary. Banks may
perform their monitoring activities through various channels. For example, banks may set
up periodic conference calls, request the review of financial statements in a timely manner,
participate in board meetings and include various covenants in loan contracts to trigger ac-
tive involvement in management through renegotiation.
The effects of implementing bank monitoring duties can be found in a wide range of
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business activities, such as mergers and acquisitions (see Su (2014)), board structure (see
Su (2015)), and other daily operations (debt ratio in Byrd and Mizruchi (2005), corporate
investment in Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini et al. (2009), the firm value in Nini et al.
(2012), earnings management behavior in Ahn and Choi (2009), etc.). Continuous and rou-
tine bank monitoring can keep the firms’ daily operations on track and enhance corporate
governance.
An external, public indicator of firm performance is the regular announcement of earn-
ings. These announcements tend to take place at regularly scheduled intervals (e.g., 25-35
days after the end of each quarter.) However, if an earnings announcement takes place at
an unscheduled time, this may be a public signal that releases some of the lenders’ private
information about firm performance. Early earnings announcements may not indicate good
performance, but late announcements usually deliver a negative signal about the company’s
performance. The delay of earnings announcements may be caused by internal disorgani-
zation in the firm’s accounting or financial processing system, the managerial intention to
reverse bad earnings through earnings management (see Trueman (1990)), the intention to
manipulate analyst forecasts to avoid negative surprises (see Matsumoto (2002)), or man-
agerial intention to take advantage of investor inattention (see DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)
and Damodaran (1989)). Indeed, there may be a behavioral explanation for late earnings
announcements: intentional managerial procrastination to avoid release of bad news (see
Chambers and Penman (1984), Kross and Schroeder (1984), and Begley and Fischer (1998)).
Prior studies mainly focus on how the delay of earnings announcements is associated
with lower stock returns. However, since banks are privy to the earnings information even
before the public release of earnings, they are not deceived by managerial procrastination in
the face of bad earnings announcements. Thus, banks can use their private information to
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prevent opportunistic timing of earnings announcements and to reduce managers’ ability to
manipulate earnings. This is the subject of this paper.
In this paper, I find that bank monitoring prevents managerial procrastination associ-
ated with bad earnings announcements. That is, ongoing bank monitoring induces borrowing
companies to provide timely financial reports and reduces managers’ ability to take advan-
tage of the delay for potential earnings management or other manipulation. Furthermore,
monitoring and certification services inherent in bank lending relationships may mitigate the
information asymmetry associated with late earnings announcements, and prevent negative
announcement effects even if the delay is unavoidable. Thus, the market expects banks to
monitor late reporting firms using contractual control rights available within loan terms. For
example, evidence of banks’ disciplinary monitoring actions involving control over the timely
release of financial statements, forecasts, or earnings announcements can be illustrated by
the following loan amendments:
• Package ID: 3425; Company: Chelsea Communications Inc
“Credit was amended to modify the definition of total debt service, and to waive any
default resulting from co.’s failure to provide an annual forecast for FY1994 in
timely manner.”
• Package ID: 62487; Company: Ceridian Corp
“Credit was amended to reflect co.’s inability to file in time its 10K form. Pricing:
Co. pays an amendment fee of $5,000.”
• Package ID: 104611; Company: American Restaurant Group
“Credit was amended to extend the time period in which borrower shall deliver
their projections, and to waive certain events of default related to the min.
EBITDA required on 9/30/02. Co. pays a $225K amendment fee.”
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• Package ID: 108503; Company: Adelphia Communications Corp
“Credit was amended to add 4/15/04 deadline for delivery of co.’s 2003 audited
financial statements. Credit also amended asset sale basket from $15M to $30M”
To test the role of bank monitoring in controlling managerial procrastination, I utilize
syndicated loan data from the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) DealScan database in order
to identify bank lending relationships. A series of reported earnings announcement dates
from Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) and Compustat are utilized to esti-
mate the expected announcement dates and delays. Controlling for analyst forecast surprises,
I find that firms with prior lending relationships are less likely to announce earnings late,
which supports my prior conjecture that banks monitor and prevent managerial procrasti-
nation of the release of bad earnings news.
However, does the market value of the monitoring role of banks in disciplining opportunis-
tically late release of bad earnings announcements? I investigate the impact of bank lending
relationships on earnings announcement returns. I find that when firms delay their public
disclosures of earnings, the market does not react as negatively when there is a banking rela-
tionship as when there is no banking relationship. I also revisit the good news early and bad
news late hypothesis by examining the announcement effects of lateness. The findings show
that the observed negative late effect remains only when the firms do not have prior lending
relationships, whereas the negative effect disappears if the firms have established lending
relationships, suggesting that the market is more tolerant to late earnings announcements if
the bank monitoring mechanism exists.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature and
develops hypotheses. Section 3.3 discusses the data sets and descriptive statistics. Section 3.4
describes estimation models and methodologies and explains the empirical results. Section
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3.5 summarizes the findings.
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
This paper is related to two distinct strands of research: bank lending relationships and the
timing of earnings announcements. I will review both strands of literature below and develop
hypotheses accordingly.
3.2.1 Literature- Bank Lending Relationships
The field of bank lending relationships has been extensively explored. Leland and Pyle (1977)
and Diamond (1991, 1984) modeled the costs of resolving information asymmetry between
borrowers and lenders, and reached the conclusion that, in equilibrium, banks develop their
expertise in collecting and processing information through repeated lending transactions that
lower the bank’s monitoring costs, thereby providing banks a comparative advantage in pro-
viding monitoring services. James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) find positive
abnormal returns upon loan approvals, indicating that the stock market views bank lending
activity as a positive signal.
Consequently, researchers began investigating the benefits and costs associated with bank
lending relationships. It was observed that relationship lenders tend to pass the benefits of
the lending relationships to the borrowers through the channel of the subsequent lending
in the form of loan terms, covenants, and fund availability (see Petersen and Rajan (1994,
1995), Berger and Udell (1995, 1996), and Bharath et al. (2011)). However, Sharpe (1990)
and Rajan (1992), in contrast, find that borrowers incur potential costs because the bank
lending relationship confers market power on lending banks. Such expansion of banks’ market
power grants banks more bargaining power to extract monopoly rents from bank-dependent
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borrowers, thereby increasing the cost of funding. Puri (1996) also researched the conflicts
of interests embedded in the banking relationships, but found that monitoring certification
benefit dominated the hold-up costs associated with bank lending relationships.
More recent papers further extend the analysis of the role of bank monitoring to a broader
scope of firm operations. Utilizing contractual and legal rights to monitor, banks can in-
fluence the firm’s business activities or even the corporate governance mechanisms of the
borrowing firms. For example, Su (2014) explores the role of bank monitoring and certifica-
tion in M&A announcement effects. Nini et al. (2009) and Saunders et al. (2012) investigate
the change of firm performance after the covenant violations which trigger banks’ active
involvement in management. The other growing body of literature researches how the banks
affect the borrowing firms’ daily operations through the appointment of officers on board
(see Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) and Huang et al. (2014)). Allen et al. (2012) examines the
role of banks in borrowing firm dividend policy.
However, within the literature, there is an absence of work on the implementation of bank
monitoring on the timing of earnings announcements. Thus, this paper contributes to the
literature of bank lending relationships by utilizing the timing of earnings announcements
as the evidence of banks’ exercise of monitoring duties.
3.2.2 Literature- The Timing of Earnings Announcements
Earnings announcements have been one of most routine activities in a firm’s daily operations
and have also been regarded as the most direct reflection of a firm’s performance. There have
been extensive studies in the literature examining all types of potential managerial strategies
regarding earnings announcements from various perspectives, such as the timing of earnings
announcements, earnings management through various accounting standards, and relative
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analyst forecast consensus. In this paper, I examine the role of delegated monitors can be
critical in preventing opportunistic manipulation of the timing of earnings announcements.
Therefore, I provide an overview of existing studies in the timing of earnings announcements.
Early studies observed a prevailing relation between the timing of earnings announce-
ments and the stock market reactions toward the earnings news, as in the good news early
and bad news late hypothesis (see Kross (1981), Kross and Schroeder (1984), and Chambers
and Penman (1984)). The prior evidence suggested that, at least during 1970s, the bene-
fits of delaying the formal release of earnings exceeded the costs, and therefore managers
had incentives to delay the earnings announcements under certain scenarios. There are a
variety of explanations to account for this good news early and bad news phenomenon. For
example, managers may take advantage of delaying the disclosure of bad earnings to com-
plete a contract (for the company or for their own personal purposes) with better terms.
In addition, managers may delay earnings announcements to get more time to reverse the
bad performance through a change in accounting standards or arrangements, so-called earn-
ings management (see Trueman (1990)). Alternatively, managers may put off the timing of
earnings announcements to manipulate analyst forecast consensus to avoid negative earnings
surprises (see Matsumoto (2002)). The alternative source of the delay may come from the
delay of audit reports (see Dyer and McHugh (1975), Givoly and Palmon (1982), and Ash-
ton et al. (1987)), which reveals even more information about the firm performance from the
perspective of the monitors (or auditors). Though there may be various reasons for the audit
delay, such delay may still be interpreted as the negative signal about the firm performance.
Some more recent papers suggest that good news early and bad news late phenomenon
did not prevail during the 1980s because of litigation concerns. First, Skinner (1994) asserts
that the intensified litigation concerns in 1980s would induce managers to preempt formal
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releases of bad earnings with voluntary disclosures, reducing the risk of being sued under
Rule 10b-5. Secondly, it was observed that firms experience higher likelihood of facing legal
allegations if they have positive pre-announcement returns and a dramatic price drop im-
mediately afterwards upon an adverse earnings announcements (see Francis et al. (1994)),
thereby inducing auditors and managers to spend more time verifying good news and leading
to a delay in announcement of good news. Altogether with the preemption of bad news and
the delay of good news, the intensified litigation risk may serve as an efficient monitoring
mechanism eliminating the documented timing phenomenon. However, Begley and Fischer
(1998) revisited the hypothesis using announcements from 1980s to early 1990s and found
that the good news early and bad news late phenomenon remained.
Another strand of the literature examines how investors respond to earnings surprises
when earnings are announced on any specific day in a week (see DellaVigna and Pollet
(2009)), weekend (see Damodaran (1989)), or any specific period in a trading day (see Patell
and Wolfson (1982), Gennotte and Trueman (1996), and Pronk (2006)). For example, in-
vestor inattention affects the magnitude of the market’s reaction to earnings announcements,
which may motivate managers to arrange the timing of earnings announcements strategi-
cally. To accommodate those documented calendar effects, I define the dummy variable of
being late to be 7 calendar days later than expected announcement dates and include a set
of date-specific variables in the analyses of earnings announcement effects.
3.2.3 Hypotheses Development
According to the studies mentioned above, the procrastination of earnings announcements
may carry important information about firm value. As delegated monitors, banks have in-
centives to prevent managerial manipulation. One way of accomplishing this may be through
their efforts to insure timely delivery of financial statements as well as the earnings announce-
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ments. Furthermore, even though the delay of earnings announcement is not caused by any
managerial manipulation, banks’ exercise of routine monitoring duties can force the bor-
rowing firms to have up-to-date statements ready at any time for random reviews, thereby
reducing propensity of late earnings announcements. Therefore, I construct Hypothesis 1 as
followed.
Hypothesis 1: The presence of a prior bank lending relationship reduces the
probability that a firm will delay quarterly earnings announcements.
Hypothesis 1 posits that a firm is less likely to make late earnings announcements if a
prior lending relationship is present. If bank monitoring is shown to prevent the potential de-
lay of earnings announcements, thereby reducing the propensity of managerial manipulations
associated with delays, the next question will be how this type of monitoring is priced by
investors. That is, if banks serve as efficient monitors and prevent managerial manipulation
during the time period of the delay in earnings announcements, investors therefore would
perceive the presence of bank lending relationships as some assurance of the stability (or
quality) of firm performance, offsetting the documented negative late announcement effects.
Thus, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: The presence of a bank lending relationship reduces the nega-
tive impact of a delay in the announcement of abnormal returns to the earnings
announcing firms.
Hypothesis 2 examines the earnings announcement effect of delays in earnings announce-
ments in the presence of bank lending relationships. Managerial procrastination and delay
in the reporting of earnings has been shown to have detrimental impacts on the firm’s value,
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as shown by negative abnormal returns on the late announcement dates. The market pre-
sumes that the delay is indicative of potential agency problems (such as attempts at earnings
manipulation) that will exacerbate the firm’s problems. Hypothesis 2 surmises that the pres-
ence of a lending bank mitigates these concerns. Thus, the market does not react negatively
(i.e., there is no negative abnormal return) upon the late release of earnings for firms with
banking relationships.
3.3 Data and Main Variables
3.3.1 Data
I start with all available quarterly earnings announcement dates from Compustat Funda-
mentals Quarterly universe ranging from January 1990 to December 2013. I complement
the sample using quarterly earnings announcement dates from I/B/E/S database. The final
earnings announcement dates are the ones with earlier records from Compustat or I/B/E/S,
if there are discrepancies. I also obtain the analyst forecast records from I/B/E/S to calcu-
late the earnings surprises and the analyst coverage.
I obtain the bank loan data from the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC) DealScan database
to identify bank lending relationships, which proxy for the incentives for bank monitoring.
I merge the bank lending relationships to corresponding companies in Compustat via the
linking table provided by Chava and Roberts (2008). If there is no matching record from
LPC DealScan, I consider the firm as if it had no lending relationships. Accordingly, I define
Rel dummy to be equal to one if the firm has any syndicated loan transaction in the past
three years (t-3, t-1) to proxy for the prior lending relationships, and zero otherwise, which
can be written as followed.
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Rel dummy =
 1 if the firm has any syndicated loan in the past three years (t-3, t-1)0 otherwise
The monthly and daily stock returns are downloaded from the Center for Research in Se-
curity Prices (CRSP), while the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated via the
Eventus system [Cowan (2005). Eventus software, version 8.0]. CARs are estimated based
on the CAPM market model (MM) over the window of (-365, -46) with both value- and
equal-weighted benchmarks. Three CAR measurements with different windows, including
1-day window (0,0), 2-day window (0,+1), and 3-day window (-1, +1), are therefore defined
as the summation of abnormal returns for the corresponding windows.
To be included in the final sample set, the firms need to meet the following criteria:
• Firms need to have consecutive quarterly earnings announcement dates (for current
quarter q, previous quarter q-1, and previous fourth quarter q-4 ) reported on either
I/B/E/S or Compustat.
• Firms are not utility companies (SIC ranges from 4900 to 4999), nor financial institu-
tions (SIC ranges from 6000 to 6999).
• Firms need to have trading records on CRSP for return information and records on
Compustat for firm-specific information.
• Firms need to have at least one analyst forecast for the reporting quarter posted on
I/B/E/S for analyst consensus.
After considering the availability of control variables, my final sample contains 51,022
firm quarters ranging from 1999 to 2013 and covers 3,061 distinct firms. Among 51,022 firm
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quarters, 28,371 firm quarters have no prior lending relationship in the past three years,
while 22,651 firm quarters are found to have prior lending relationships in the past three
years.
3.3.2 Main Variables: Delay and Late dummy
To test the first hypothesis of the impact of bank monitoring over lateness of earnings an-
nouncements, I follow Kross and Schroeder (1984) and Begley and Fischer (1998)’s method-
ology to measure the lateness of earnings announcement. I first estimate the “Lagi,q” which is
defined as the number of days between the end of reporting quarter q and the announcement
date of quarter q ’s earnings for firm i.
˜Lagi,q = f(Lagi,q−1, Lagi,q−4, LagIndustry,q, Calendar Quarter FE))
where:
• L̃agi,q is the predicted lag of earnings announcements for firm i in quarter q.
• Lagi,q−1 and Lagi,q−4 refer to the actual lag of earnings announcements for firm i in
quarter q-1 and q-4 respectively.
• LagIndustry,q is the industry average lag of earnings announcements in quarter q.
• Calendar Quarter FE refers to calendar quarter fixed effect identifying the first, second,
third and fourth calendar quarter.
Then, I define the variable “Delay” as the number of days between the actual earnings
announcement dates and the expected announcement dates as followed:
Delayi,q = Lagi,q − ˜Lagi,q
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Delayi,q is positive when the quarterly earnings are announced after the expected dates,
while Delayi,q is negative when the quarterly earnings are announced before the expected
dates. Delayi,q may provide an alternative measure of earnings announcement lateness. To
reduce the impact of outliers in the Delayi,q variable, I utilize an indicator variable, denoted
as Late dummy, which is designed to be equal to one if Delayi,q is equal to or greater than
7 calendar days1 (one week), and zero otherwise, which can be illustrated by the following
form:
Late dummy =
 1 if Delayi,q >= 70 if Delayi,q < 7
Table 3.2 reports the summary statistics for two subgroups- announcing firms without
and with prior lending relationships. Table 3.2 shows that firms with prior lending relation-
ships tend to use fewer days (Lag) to announce earnings and have smaller delays (Delay and
Late dummy) with the mean difference significant at 1% level, which provides preliminary
evidence to support the conjecture that bank monitoring prevents procrastination.
In addition, Table 3.2 shows that firms with prior lending relationships are more likely to
have positive quarterly earnings (Positive EPS), attract more attention from analysts (Num-
ber Forecast), have larger assets (Size), higher quarterly sales volume (Sales), higher leverage
level (Leverage), lower market-to-book ratio (MTB), higher market capital (Mkt cap), higher
returns on assets (ROA), and lower scaled selling expenses (Selling exp). It is also interesting
to note that firms with prior lending relationships, on average, retain relative lower propor-
tions of cash (Cash ratio) and lower propensities for positive accruals (Positive Accruals),
1In order to accommodate the potential calendar effects, I define the indicator variable of being late
(Late dummy) to be 7 calendar days later than expected announcement dates. An alternative Late dummy
measurement (Delayi,1 >=3) is also included for robustness tests and yields consistent results with the one
with 7-day definition. Results are available upon request.
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but hold higher portions of free cash flow (FCF ratio). In terms of stock market activities,
firms with prior lending relationships are found to have more liquidity (Turnover), smaller
past short-term returns (Reversal), and smaller past long-term returns (Momentum). A list
of variable notations and definition is provided in the Table 3.1.
3.4 Estimation Models and Empirical Results
3.4.1 Bank Lending Relationships and the Timing of Earnings An-
nouncements
To test Hypothesis 1 about the impact of bank lending relationships (monitoring) over the
timing of earnings announcements, I utilize three estimation models, including logit regres-
sions, ordinary least square (OLS) regressions and seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR).
In logit regressions, I test the impact of the presence of a prior lending relationship
on the propensity to announce earnings late. Accordingly, the dependent variable, Y, is
Late dummy (see Section 3.3.2 for variable construction details), which is equal to one if
Delayi,q is equal to or greater than 7 days, and zero otherwise. The logit regression is
formulated as followed.
Late dummy(Y ) = α + β ∗Rel dummy + γ ∗XFirm + ε (3.1)
XFirm refers to a set of firm-specific control variables, including the indicator variable for
positive EPS (Positive EPS), analysis forecast errors using either the mean or the median
of the analyst forecast (Surprise mean or Surprise median2), the analyst coverage (Num-
2The earnings surprise is measured by the differences of actual EPS and the mean (median) of analyst
forecast EPS on the earnings announcement date scaled by the stock price of the last trading day of the
reporting quarter. An alternative earnings surprise measured on the expected announcement date is also
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ber Forecast), firm size (Size), quarterly sales volume (Sales), leverage ratio (Leverage),
market-to-book ratio (MTB), market capital in thousands of dollars (Mkt cap), returns on
assets (ROA), scaled research and development expenses (RnD exp), scaled quarterly selling
expenses (Selling exp), cash ratio (Cash ratio), free cash flow ratio (FCF ratio), the indicator
variable for positive total accruals (Positive Accruals), the past short-term returns (Rever-
sal), and the past long-term returns (Momentum). Robust standard errors and cluster effect
at the firm level are included in all specifications, while fixed effects vary across specifications.
Table 3.3 presents the estimation results of logit regressions shown in Equation (3.1). The
coefficients of Rel dummy are consistently negative and statistically significant (at the 1%
significance level) across all specifications, inferring that firms with prior lending relationships
are less likely to announce earnings late (i.e., later than expected earnings announcement
dates).
In addition to bank monitoring, I notice an alternative mechanism in monitoring the
timing of earnings announcements. That is, the monitoring by external analysts, which is
measured by the number of analysts submitting the earnings forecasts. The negative and
significant coefficients on the Number Forecast variable reveal that analysts also serve as an
important source of external monitoring preventing the delay of earnings announcements.
Surprisingly, the earnings surprises (based on the average of consensus or the median
of the forecast) show no significant effect on the delay of announcements. Thus, manage-
rial delay in the release of earnings information is not related to the error in the analyst
forecasts. On the other hand, the coefficients of Positive EPS are negative and statistically
calculated for robustness tests and yields consistent results with the earnings surprised measured on the
actual earnings announcement date. Results are available upon request.
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significant across specifications, which lends partial support to good news early hypothe-
sis. Positive EPS serves as an alternative indicator for “good” news and provides a more
straight-forward evidence of qualified firm performance.
As another test of the impact of the role of lenders in the timing of public release of
earnings information, I run OLS regressions using Delayi,q (as a continuous variable in terms
of days) as the dependent variable. The estimations of OLS regressions can be presented
below:
Delay(Y ) = α + β ∗Rel dummy + γ ∗XFirm + ε (3.2)
Table 3.4 reports the OLS estimation results of Equation (3.2). Consistent with Table 3.3
results, the coefficients on Rel dummy are negative and statistically significant, suggesting
that earnings are more timely in the presence of banking relationships. Moreover, the coef-
ficients on the Number Forecast variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating
that external monitoring by analysts reduces the delay in earnings announcements. The
coefficients on earnings surprises remain insignificant, whereas the coefficients for positive
EPS indicator remain negative and statistically significant, consistent with the logit results
presented in Table 3.3.
There might be a potential simultaneity concern associated with the analysis of the tim-
ing of the earnings announcements. That is, the analysts may revise their forecasts promptly
to reflect the timing of earnings announcements. Therefore, the delay and the earnings sur-
prises may be determined simultaneously. To address this type of simultaneity concern, I
conduct a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model, which estimates two equations si-
multaneously as follows.
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
Delay = α1 + β1 ∗Rel dummy + γ1 ∗XFirm + ε1
Surprise = α2 + β2 ∗Rel dummy + γ2 ∗XFirm + ε2
Table 3.5 provides the empirical results for the SUR model. Model (1) in Table 3.5 shows
the results for full sample, while Model (2) and (3) present the results for sub-samples of neg-
ative delays (early announcements) and positive delays (late announcements) respectively to
test the differential impacts of bank monitoring over the timing of earnings announcements.
The results show that the earnings are announced earlier (i.e, fewer delays and earlier ac-
celerated announcements) when firms have prior lending relationships. The magnitude of
this effect is greater for earnings announcements after the expected date (positive delays) as
compared to announcements before the expected date (negative delays). Further, Table 3.5
shows that the more analysts that monitor the firm (forecast firm earnings), the smaller
the delays, consistent with previous findings finding the presence of analysts performs as an
external monitoring mechanism that prevents delays. On the other hand, the analyst cov-
erage on average has a positive impact over the earnings surprises, implying that a broader
analyst coverage suppresses the forecast consensuses. This effect is larger in magnitude in
positive delay group (when earnings are announced after the expected dates) as compared
to negative delay observations.
3.4.2 The Impact on Returns of Bank Monitoring of Earnings
Announcement
In this section, I examine the impact on firm returns of bank lenders’ monitoring of the timing
of earnings announcement, as stated in Hypothesis 2. I start with the OLS regressions of
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cumulative abnormal returns, which can be illustrated by the following equation:
CAR(Y ) = α+β ∗Rel dummy+δ∗Late dummy+ζ ∗(Rel∗Late)+γ ∗XFirm+λ∗XDate+ε
(3.3)
Hypothesis 2 postulates that the presence of a bank lending relationship reduces the neg-
ative announcement abnormal returns associated with delays in earnings announcements.
Therefore, cumulative abnormal return (CAR) serves as the dependent variable at the left
hand side of the OLS regression in Equation (3.3). In addition to the interested variable,
Rel dummy, I control for the indicator of the announcement delay, Late dummy, the cross
product of Rel dummy and Late dummy, the same set of firm-specific (XFirm) control vari-
ables used in Equations (3.1) and (3.2) and a set of date-specific (XDate) controls to cap-
ture the potential calendar effects. XDate includes a dummy for Monday announcements
(Monday), a dummy for Friday announcements (Friday), and a dummy for January an-
nouncements (January). Fixed calendar quarter, fiscal quarter, and industry effects, robust
standard errors, and cluster effect at the firm level are also included in all regressions.
Table 3.6 provides the estimation results for the baseline regressions shown in Equation
(3.3). Columns (1) to (6) represent the regressions utilizing different CAR measurements
(with different weighting schemes (value as opposed to equally weighted market indices)
for three different announcement windows (one-day CAR(0,0), two-day CAR (0,+1) and
three-day CAR(-1,+1)) as the dependent variables. The empirical results show a consistent
negative announcement effect of being late, implying that the late releases contain some
private information about managerial intentions and potential manipulation which may dis-
tort the future firm performance. The existence of a prior lending relationship per se is not
significantly associated with a positive announcement effect, but the coefficients for the cross
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product of prior lending relationships and late announcements are positive and significant
across all specifications. The positive effect of the interaction term fully offsets the negative
effect associated with the lateness, thereby implying that investors appreciate the monitoring
services provided by the lending banks and do not penalize late reporting firms.
On the other hand, the number of analysts forecasting earnings is not found to signif-
icantly impact the market’s reaction to earnings announcements, indicating that analyst
consensus and external monitoring by analysts does not contain private information.
As expected, Positive EPS serves as one proxy for good news, leading to higher CARs.
Earnings surprises itself do not lead to higher CARs, but the interaction term with Posi-
tive EPS does increase CARs, indicating that earnings surprises increase CARs only when
the earnings are positive. This result is in line with prior research which shows that “earnings
response coefficients are essentially zero for negative earnings” (see Mian and Sankaragu-
ruswamy (2012), Hayn (1995), and Lipe et al. (1998)).
To further test the role of bank monitoring in negative late announcement effect, I divide
the sample into two sub-samples: firms with and without prior lending relationships. I run
the regressions in Equation (3.3) for the two subgroups (with and without Rel dummy). The
estimation results for sub-sample regressions are shown in Table 3.7 (1-day CARs), Table
3.8 (2-day CARs), and Table 3.9 (3-day CARs). In all cases, the announcement effect on
late earnings releases is significantly negative when there is no banking relationship, but
statistically insignificant from zero when there is a banking relationship.
Table 3.7 shows the estimations for 1-day CAR regressions: Column (1) and (2) use
the value-weighted CARs as the dependent variables, while Column (3) and (4) use the
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equal-weighted CARs as the dependent variables. It is worth noting that the coefficients of
Late dummy become negative and statistically significant in “No Relationship” sub-groups,
but turns insignificant in “With Relationships” sub-groups. The significant effects of late
announcements in Column (1) and (3) are consistent with the good news early and bad
news late phenomenon mentioned in prior literature (see Kross and Schroeder (1984), Ash-
ton et al. (1987), Begley and Fischer (1998), and etc.). In contrast, the insignificant effects of
late announcements in Column (2) and (4) manifest bank monitoring effects in late earnings
announcements, which supports Hypothesis 2 that the presence of a lending bank mitigates
the concerns of managerial procrastination and therefore reduces the negative effect of a
delay in the earnings announcement.
I report the estimation results for 2-day CAR sub-sample regressions in Table 3.8 and
3-day CAR sub-sample regressions in Table 3.9. Again, I obtain a consistent negative earn-
ings announcement effect in “No Relationship” group, and similar insignificant coefficients
in Late dummy in “With Relationships” group, suggesting that banks certify the firm per-
formance at the late earnings announcement dates and therefore reduce the negative impact
of a delay in the announcement of abnormal returns to the earnings announcing firms.
3.5 Conclusion
As delegated monitors, banks are granted several contractual and legal rights to become
involved in borrowing firms’ daily operations. This paper indicates that banks become in-
volved in routine tasks such as the timing of earnings announcements and the delivery of
the financial reports. I find that periodic bank monitoring forces the borrowing company to
provide timely financial reports and reduces the propensity that managers take advantage of
any delay to engage in potential earnings management or other manipulations. Furthermore,
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monitoring and certification services inherent in bank lending relationships may mitigate the
information asymmetry out of the late announcements and provide an additional protection
buffer to negative announcement effects even if the delay is unavoidable.
Utilizing a series of earnings announcements from 1999 to 2013, I find that bank monitor-
ing can effectively reduce the propensity of the procrastination of earnings announcements
and therefore the monitoring and certification services provided by lending banks offset the
negative late announcement effect. Moreover, I find that the market is more tolerant to de-
lays in public release of earnings information in the presence of a bank lending relationship.
Thus, the negative abnormal return accompanying late releases of earnings information is
observed only when a bank lending relationship is not present.
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Table 3.1: Variable Notations and Definitions
Variable Notation Definition
Main Variables
Lag The number of days between the actual earnings announcements and the
last day of the reporting quarter.
Delay The number of days between the actual earnings announcements and the
predicted dates.
Late dummy Dummy variable=1 if the actual earnings announcements are made 7
days or more after the predicted dates.
Rel dummy Dummy variable=1 if the firm has established lending relationships with
any banks in the past three years (-3,-1).
MM CAR VW 1day One-day (0,0) (cumulative) abnormal returns based on value-weighted
market model.
MM CAR VW 2day Two-day (0,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on value-weighted
market model.
MM CAR VW 3day Three-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on value-weighted
market model.
MM CAR EW 1day One-day (0,0) (cumulative) abnormal returns based on equal-weighted
market model.
MM CAR EW 2day Two-day (0,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on equal-weighted
market model.
MM CAR EW 3day Three-day (-1,+1) cumulative abnormal returns based on equal-weighted
market model.
XFirm
Positive EPS Dummy variable=1 if the firm has positive EPS announced
Surprise mean Difference of actual EPS and the mean of analyst forecast EPS on the
earnings announcement date scaled by the stock price of the last trading
day of the reporting quarter
Surprise median Difference of actual EPS and the median of analyst forecast EPS on the
earnings announcement date scaled by the stock price of the last trading
day of the reporting quarter
Number Forecast The number of analyst estimates as reported in I/B/E/S
Size Natural logarithm of total assets
Sales Quarterly sales amount
Leverage The ratio of debt (both long term and short term portion) over total
assets
MTB Market to book ratio, or the ratio of market capital over book value of
total assets
Mkt cap Market capital (in thousand dollars)
ROA Return on Assets, or the ratio of quarterly EBIT over total assets
RnD exp Scaled quarterly research and development expenses by quarterly sales
Selling exp Scaled quarterly selling, general and administrative expenditures by
quarterly sales
Cash ratio Scaled cash by total assets
FCF ratio Scaled quarterly free cash flow by total assets
Positive Accruals Dummy variable=1 if scaled total accruals by quarterly total assets is
positive. Scaled total accruals is defined as (4 current assets−4 current
liabilities − 4 cash +4 short-term debt − depreciation)/quarterly total
assets (see Matsumoto (2002))
Turnover The trading volume of the prior quarter divided by a million shares out-
standing at the end of prior quarter
Reversal The stock return of the prior month (t-1) of the announcing month
Momentum The cumulated monthly stock return from month t-12 to t-2, while t is
the announcing month
XDate
Monday Dummy variable=1 if the earnings announcement date falls on Monday
Friday Dummy variable=1 if the earnings announcement date falls on Friday
January Dummy variable=1 if the earnings announcement date falls in January
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Table 3.3: Logit Regressions- The Timing of Earnings Announcements
Dependent variable: Late Dummy; Independent variable notations and definitions are
provided in Table 3.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and various
fixed effects are also considered across specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Late Dummy Late Dummy Late Dummy Late Dummy
Rel dummy -0.174∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Surprise mean -0.0157 -0.0177
(0.783) (0.735)
Surprise median -0.0162 -0.0184
(0.780) (0.730)
Positive EPS -0.446∗∗∗ -0.446∗∗∗ -0.446∗∗∗ -0.446∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Positive EPS × Surprise mean 0.00334 0.154
(0.995) (0.750)
Positive EPS × Surprise median 0.0213 0.158
(0.967) (0.757)
Number Forecast -0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0528∗∗∗ -0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0528∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size -0.268∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.289∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales -0.00437 -0.0129 -0.00437 -0.0129
(0.716) (0.297) (0.716) (0.297)
Leverage 0.524∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MTB -0.138∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mkt cap 0.00000565∗ 0.00000788∗∗∗ 0.00000565∗ 0.00000788∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.004) (0.076) (0.004)
ROA -0.639∗∗∗ -0.697∗∗∗ -0.639∗∗∗ -0.697∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
RnD ratio -0.00146 -0.000593 -0.00146 -0.000593
(0.396) (0.781) (0.397) (0.781)
Selling exp 0.000876 0.000354 0.000876 0.000354
(0.413) (0.787) (0.413) (0.787)
Cash ratio -0.636∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗ -0.636∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗
(0.002) (0.025) (0.002) (0.025)
FCF ratio -0.559 -0.795∗ -0.559 -0.796∗
(0.211) (0.072) (0.211) (0.071)
Positive Accruals -0.00716 -0.0195 -0.00721 -0.0195
(0.884) (0.698) (0.883) (0.698)
Turnover 0.181∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Reversal -0.396∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗ -0.396∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Momentum -0.189∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.242∗∗∗ -1.583∗∗∗ -1.242∗∗∗ -1.583∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Calendar Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 51022 50864 51022 50864
Pseudo R2 0.255 0.263 0.255 0.263
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: OLS Regressions- The Timing of Earnings Announcements
Dependent variable: Delay; Independent variable notations and definitions are provided in
Table 3.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and various fixed effects
are also considered across specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Delay Delay Delay Delay
Rel dummy -0.256∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Surprise mean -0.286 -0.287
(0.302) (0.290)
Surprise median -0.291 -0.292
(0.300) (0.288)
Positive EPS -0.631∗∗∗ -0.625∗∗∗ -0.631∗∗∗ -0.626∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Positive EPS × Surprise mean -0.480 -0.121
(0.725) (0.929)
Positive EPS × Surprise median -0.392 -0.0418
(0.782) (0.976)
Number Forecast -0.0514∗∗∗ -0.0493∗∗∗ -0.0514∗∗∗ -0.0493∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size -0.345∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales 0.0119 -0.00351 0.0119 -0.00352
(0.124) (0.629) (0.123) (0.628)
Leverage 0.723∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
MTB -0.175∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)
Mkt cap 0.00000265 0.00000564∗∗∗ 0.00000265 0.00000564∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.010) (0.301) (0.010)
ROA -3.689∗∗∗ -3.891∗∗∗ -3.694∗∗∗ -3.895∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
RnD ratio -0.00981∗∗∗ -0.00927∗∗∗ -0.00981∗∗∗ -0.00927∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Selling exp 0.00585∗∗∗ 0.00553∗∗∗ 0.00585∗∗∗ 0.00553∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cash ratio -1.219∗∗∗ -0.937∗∗∗ -1.220∗∗∗ -0.937∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
FCF ratio 0.00296 -0.471 0.00374 -0.471
(0.997) (0.596) (0.997) (0.597)
Positive Accruals 0.0647 0.00519 0.0646 0.00511
(0.340) (0.940) (0.340) (0.941)
Turnover 0.0501 0.00665 0.0504 0.00685
(0.422) (0.916) (0.419) (0.913)
Reversal -0.504∗ -0.519∗∗ -0.504∗ -0.520∗∗
(0.055) (0.048) (0.055) (0.048)
Momentum -0.500∗∗∗ -0.530∗∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗ -0.530∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.854∗∗∗ 1.256∗∗∗ 1.854∗∗∗ 1.256∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003)
Calendar Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 51022 51022 51022 51022
Adjusted R2 0.160 0.167 0.160 0.167
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: SUR Regressions- The Timing of Earnings Announcements
Delay and Surprise mean serve as dependent variables in each set of seemingly unrelated
regressions (SUR). Independent variable notations and definitions are provided in Table 3.1.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and fixed calendar, fiscal quarter and
industry effects are also considered in all specifications.
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Negative Delay Positive Delay
Delay Surprise mean Delay Surprise mean Delay Surprise mean
Rel dummy -0.278∗∗∗ -0.00330 -0.0971∗ -0.00161 -0.208∗ -0.00785
(0.000) (0.222) (0.074) (0.161) (0.058) (0.319)
Positive EPS -0.630∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0213 0.0146∗∗∗ -0.975∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.782) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013)
Number Forecast -0.0495∗∗∗ 0.000812∗∗∗ -0.00804∗ 0.000400∗∗∗ -0.0607∗∗∗ 0.00147∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.024)
Size -0.358∗∗∗ -0.00193 0.0419∗ -0.00133∗∗ -0.342∗∗∗ -0.00392
(0.000) (0.108) (0.088) (0.010) (0.000) (0.256)
Sales -0.00363 0.000391 0.0105 0.000197 -0.0208 0.000483
(0.677) (0.293) (0.142) (0.193) (0.212) (0.687)
Leverage 0.779∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗ 0.0775 -0.00716∗∗∗ 0.651∗∗∗ -0.0158
(0.000) (0.033) (0.551) (0.009) (0.006) (0.355)
MTB -0.132∗∗∗ -0.00200∗ 0.0167 -0.00133∗∗∗ -0.0831∗ -0.00153
(0.000) (0.069) (0.455) (0.005) (0.059) (0.628)
Mkt cap 0.00000568∗∗∗ -0.000000143 -0.00000617∗∗∗ -6.74e-08∗ 0.0000143∗∗∗ -0.000000216
(0.009) (0.122) (0.000) (0.072) (0.001) (0.478)
ROA -4.097∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.933∗ 0.320∗∗∗ -5.283∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
RnD ratio -0.00921 -0.000201 -0.0132 -0.000351 0.00283 -0.000153
(0.114) (0.420) (0.281) (0.174) (0.685) (0.761)
Selling exp 0.00549 0.000125 0.00816 0.000213 -0.00137 0.0000951
(0.114) (0.399) (0.265) (0.169) (0.713) (0.721)
Cash ratio -0.946∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗ -0.105 0.0121∗∗∗ -1.580∗∗∗ 0.0483
(0.000) (0.006) (0.631) (0.009) (0.000) (0.105)
FCF ratio -0.362 -0.383∗∗∗ -0.302 -0.140∗∗∗ 1.750∗ -0.739∗∗∗
(0.595) (0.000) (0.628) (0.000) (0.099) (0.000)
Positive Accruals 0.0102 -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.0483 -0.00297∗∗ -0.0119 -0.0438∗∗∗
(0.876) (0.000) (0.388) (0.012) (0.916) (0.000)
Turnover 0.00752 -0.00319 -0.0986∗∗ -0.00244∗∗ 0.241∗∗ -0.00502
(0.889) (0.166) (0.032) (0.012) (0.011) (0.463)
Reversal -0.528∗∗∗ 0.0270∗∗∗ 0.288 0.0118∗∗∗ -0.619∗ 0.0431∗
(0.008) (0.001) (0.104) (0.002) (0.055) (0.063)
Momentum -0.537∗∗∗ 0.0263∗∗∗ -0.139∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗ -0.703∗∗∗ 0.0505∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Calendar Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 51022 34165 16857
R2 0.168 0.033 0.113 0.049 0.126 0.043
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: OLS Regressions- Earnings Announcement Effects
Dependent variable: CARs with different specifications (VW= Value-weighted, EW= Equal-weighted;
1D= 1-day (0,0), 2D=2-day (0,+1), 3D=3-day (-1,+1)); Independent variable notations and definitions
are provided in Table 3.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and fixed calendar, fiscal
quarter and industry effects are also considered in all specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR-VW-1D CAR-EW-1D CAR-VW-2D CAR-EW-2D CAR-VW-3D CAR-EW-3D
Rel dummy 0.0307 0.0325 0.103 0.0914 0.132 0.131
(0.628) (0.606) (0.281) (0.336) (0.186) (0.188)
Late dummy -0.416∗∗ -0.441∗∗∗ -0.978∗∗∗ -1.011∗∗∗ -0.684∗∗ -0.707∗∗
(0.015) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.011)
Rel dummy × Late dummy 0.677∗∗ 0.696∗∗ 1.202∗∗∗ 1.248∗∗∗ 0.898∗ 0.950∗∗
(0.028) (0.023) (0.007) (0.005) (0.056) (0.043)
Surprise mean 0.178 0.201 0.163 0.215 0.122 0.193
(0.182) (0.153) (0.305) (0.194) (0.475) (0.275)
Positive EPS 0.835∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗ 2.042∗∗∗ 2.021∗∗∗ 2.072∗∗∗ 2.041∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Positive EPS × Surprise mean 17.18∗∗∗ 17.21∗∗∗ 36.38∗∗∗ 36.49∗∗∗ 39.07∗∗∗ 39.01∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number Forecast -0.000987 -0.000940 0.00279 0.00395 0.00341 0.00516
(0.822) (0.831) (0.704) (0.593) (0.659) (0.503)
Size -0.125∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ -0.228∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales 0.00499 0.00493 0.0129 0.0134 0.0164∗ 0.0160
(0.394) (0.407) (0.160) (0.150) (0.094) (0.106)
Leverage 0.262 0.232 0.519∗∗ 0.490∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.150) (0.035) (0.045) (0.008) (0.010)
MTB -0.120∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Mkt cap -0.000000400 -0.000000463 -0.00000601∗∗∗ -0.00000613∗∗∗ -0.00000477∗∗ -0.00000472∗∗
(0.753) (0.723) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.023)
ROA 0.0282 0.0685 2.520∗ 2.537∗ 2.053 2.093
(0.978) (0.945) (0.085) (0.081) (0.216) (0.201)
RnD ratio -0.00859∗∗∗ -0.00840∗∗∗ -0.0108∗∗∗ -0.0111∗∗∗ -0.00924∗∗ -0.00930∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.015) (0.013)
Selling exp 0.00558∗∗∗ 0.00547∗∗∗ 0.00678∗∗∗ 0.00695∗∗∗ 0.00586∗∗ 0.00590∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.009)
Cash ratio 0.192 0.221 0.725∗ 0.727∗ 0.742∗ 0.722∗
(0.467) (0.398) (0.078) (0.076) (0.081) (0.089)
FCF ratio 5.689∗∗∗ 5.523∗∗∗ 16.74∗∗∗ 16.44∗∗∗ 18.31∗∗∗ 17.82∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Positive Accruals 0.0731 0.0715 -0.259∗∗ -0.256∗∗ -0.200∗ -0.200∗
(0.260) (0.269) (0.014) (0.015) (0.067) (0.066)
Turnover 0.0601 0.0608 -0.269∗∗ -0.275∗∗ -0.255∗∗ -0.272∗∗
(0.413) (0.411) (0.015) (0.013) (0.026) (0.017)
Reversal -0.238 -0.305 0.156 0.0586 0.444 0.210
(0.410) (0.289) (0.742) (0.902) (0.374) (0.671)
Momentum -0.564∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗ -1.022∗∗∗ -0.795∗∗∗ -1.428∗∗∗ -1.073∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Monday -0.0313 -0.00392 -0.326∗∗ -0.224∗ -0.208 -0.195
(0.706) (0.962) (0.016) (0.095) (0.140) (0.165)
Friday 0.0160 -0.0740 -0.0505 -0.100 0.0956 0.0156
(0.916) (0.625) (0.816) (0.642) (0.669) (0.944)
January 0.0936 -0.0342 0.130 -0.149 0.0739 -0.301
(0.447) (0.782) (0.518) (0.459) (0.720) (0.146)
Constant 0.551 0.412 0.516 0.314 1.030 0.814
(0.265) (0.394) (0.527) (0.695) (0.207) (0.314)
Calendar Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 49187 49187 49185 49185 49185 49185
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.012 0.033 0.031 0.036 0.032
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
CHAPTER 3. BANK MONITORING AND MANAGERIAL PROCRASTINATION 105
Table 3.7: Subsample OLS Regressions- Earnings Announcement Effects
Dependent variable: 1-day CARs with different specifications (VW= Value-weighted, EW= Equal-weighted,
1D= 1-day (0,0)); Independent variable notations and definitions are provided in Table 3.1. Column (1)
and (3) include the subsample of firms without any prior lending relationship, while Column (2) and (4)
include the subsample of firms with prior lending relationships. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and fixed calendar, fiscal quarter and industry effects are also considered in all specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR-VW-1D CAR-VW-1D CAR-EW-1D CAR-EW-1D
No Relationship With Relationships No Relationship With Relationships
Late dummy -0.381∗∗ 0.223 -0.404∗∗ 0.222
(0.033) (0.409) (0.023) (0.409)
Surprise mean 0.0508 0.164 0.161 0.179
(0.966) (0.177) (0.891) (0.156)
Positive EPS 0.769∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Positive EPS × Surprise mean 21.90∗∗ 13.42∗∗ 21.93∗∗ 13.38∗∗
(0.031) (0.020) (0.031) (0.019)
Number Forecast -0.00448 0.00543 -0.00472 0.00554
(0.441) (0.432) (0.419) (0.422)
Size -0.0685∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.0681∗ -0.193∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.000) (0.068) (0.000)
Sales 0.00448 0.00309 0.00479 0.00265
(0.596) (0.700) (0.563) (0.749)
Leverage -0.0683 0.580∗∗ -0.0670 0.530∗∗
(0.783) (0.010) (0.787) (0.019)
MTB -0.0765∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ -0.0784∗∗ -0.320∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
Mkt cap -0.000000845 0.00000133 -0.000000876 0.00000126
(0.591) (0.487) (0.575) (0.524)
ROA -0.617 1.582 -0.621 1.603
(0.660) (0.333) (0.658) (0.321)
RnD ratio -0.00681∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗ -0.00665∗∗∗ 0.674∗
(0.003) (0.032) (0.003) (0.066)
Selling exp 0.00452∗∗∗ 0.0237∗ 0.00442∗∗∗ 0.0212
(0.001) (0.096) (0.001) (0.102)
Cash ratio -0.0842 0.867 -0.0588 0.914
(0.772) (0.163) (0.838) (0.139)
FCF ratio 4.611∗∗∗ 8.417∗∗∗ 4.560∗∗∗ 8.130∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Positive Accruals 0.0843 0.119 0.0903 0.109
(0.299) (0.243) (0.265) (0.279)
Turnover -0.0428 0.144 -0.0380 0.144
(0.650) (0.167) (0.688) (0.170)
Reversal -0.327 -0.148 -0.384 -0.220
(0.400) (0.730) (0.322) (0.606)
Momentum -0.438∗∗∗ -0.674∗∗∗ -0.357∗∗∗ -0.534∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Monday -0.0439 -0.00742 -0.0366 0.0476
(0.674) (0.956) (0.726) (0.720)
Friday -0.0728 0.126 -0.140 0.0111
(0.725) (0.578) (0.499) (0.961)
January 0.0758 0.0850 -0.0496 -0.0448
(0.645) (0.640) (0.763) (0.806)
Constant 0.584 0.462 0.436 0.323
(0.318) (0.488) (0.452) (0.613)
Calendar Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26925 22262 26925 22262
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.012
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.8: Subsample OLS Regressions- Earnings Announcement Effects
Dependent variable: 2-day CARs with different specifications (VW= Value-weighted, EW= Equal-weighted,
2D= 2-day (0,+1)); Independent variable notations and definitions are provided in Table 3.1. Column
(1) and (3) include the subsample of firms without any prior lending relationship, while Column (2) and
(4) include the subsample of firms with prior lending relationships. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and fixed calendar, fiscal quarter and industry effects are also considered in all specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR-VW-2D CAR-VW-2D CAR-EW-2D CAR-EW-2D
No Relationship With Relationships No Relationship With Relationships
Late dummy -0.854∗∗∗ 0.0898 -0.880∗∗∗ 0.105
(0.001) (0.823) (0.001) (0.793)
Surprise mean -0.153 0.111 -0.00978 0.156
(0.888) (0.447) (0.993) (0.299)
Positive EPS 1.988∗∗∗ 2.282∗∗∗ 1.956∗∗∗ 2.281∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Positive EPS × Surprise mean 41.35∗∗ 32.41∗∗∗ 41.38∗∗ 32.52∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Number Forecast 0.00447 0.00704 0.00446 0.00893
(0.647) (0.530) (0.648) (0.425)
Size -0.112∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗ -0.114∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.000) (0.043) (0.000)
Sales 0.0124 0.00529 0.0134 0.00524
(0.315) (0.648) (0.280) (0.658)
Leverage 0.368 0.557∗ 0.382 0.498
(0.317) (0.091) (0.298) (0.125)
MTB -0.0592 -0.599∗∗∗ -0.0619 -0.605∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.000) (0.263) (0.000)
Mkt cap -0.00000659∗ -0.00000249 -0.00000651∗ -0.00000266
(0.063) (0.322) (0.063) (0.296)
ROA 1.211 6.524∗∗∗ 1.220 6.457∗∗∗
(0.540) (0.003) (0.536) (0.003)
RnD ratio -0.00703∗ 0.917 -0.00722∗∗ 0.778
(0.055) (0.137) (0.045) (0.202)
Selling exp 0.00449∗∗ 0.0332 0.00460∗∗ 0.0375
(0.045) (0.377) (0.037) (0.303)
Cash ratio 0.506 0.986 0.485 1.064
(0.283) (0.249) (0.303) (0.210)
FCF ratio 14.42∗∗∗ 23.88∗∗∗ 14.31∗∗∗ 23.37∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Positive Accruals -0.183 -0.204 -0.174 -0.207
(0.188) (0.178) (0.210) (0.170)
Turnover -0.432∗∗∗ -0.161 -0.430∗∗∗ -0.168
(0.003) (0.321) (0.003) (0.307)
Reversal -0.291 0.575 -0.344 0.440
(0.607) (0.456) (0.543) (0.568)
Momentum -0.799∗∗∗ -1.239∗∗∗ -0.629∗∗∗ -0.953∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Monday -0.320∗ -0.303 -0.254 -0.155
(0.072) (0.145) (0.153) (0.452)
Friday -0.173 0.106 -0.234 0.0720
(0.503) (0.770) (0.362) (0.841)
January 0.408 -0.203 0.132 -0.486∗
(0.148) (0.459) (0.639) (0.078)
Constant 0.367 0.677 0.152 0.460
(0.674) (0.546) (0.862) (0.667)
Calendar Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26923 22262 26923 22262
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.037 0.030 0.034
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
CHAPTER 3. BANK MONITORING AND MANAGERIAL PROCRASTINATION 107
Table 3.9: Subsample OLS Regressions- Earnings Announcement Effects
Dependent variable: 3-day CARs with different specifications (VW= Value-weighted, EW= Equal-weighted,
3D= 3-day (-1,+1)); Independent variable notations and definitions are provided in Table 3.1. Column
(1) and (3) include the subsample of firms without any prior lending relationship, while Column (2) and
(4) include the subsample of firms with prior lending relationships. Robust standard errors are clustered
at the firm level and fixed calendar, fiscal quarter and industry effects are also considered in all specifications.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR-VW-3D CAR-VW-3D CAR-EW-3D CAR-EW-3D
No Relationship With Relationships No Relationship With Relationships
Late dummy -0.619∗∗ 0.102 -0.639∗∗ 0.142
(0.030) (0.806) (0.024) (0.731)
Surprise mean -1.849 0.171 -1.732 0.234
(0.168) (0.353) (0.191) (0.229)
Positive EPS 2.068∗∗∗ 2.281∗∗∗ 2.033∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Positive EPS × Surprise mean 43.08∗∗ 37.00∗∗∗ 42.93∗∗ 36.99∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Number Forecast 0.00917 0.00337 0.00905 0.00648
(0.357) (0.776) (0.365) (0.581)
Size -0.208∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales 0.0236∗ 0.00352 0.0245∗ 0.00204
(0.082) (0.756) (0.072) (0.859)
Leverage 0.674∗ 0.627∗ 0.698∗ 0.573∗
(0.078) (0.062) (0.067) (0.081)
MTB -0.111∗ -0.661∗∗∗ -0.109∗ -0.662∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.000) (0.062) (0.000)
Mkt cap -0.00000576 -0.00000108 -0.00000555 -0.00000105
(0.105) (0.664) (0.118) (0.677)
ROA 1.239 5.869∗∗ 1.238 5.847∗∗
(0.526) (0.038) (0.521) (0.037)
RnD ratio -0.00539 0.870 -0.00530 0.647
(0.157) (0.200) (0.153) (0.352)
Selling exp 0.00355 0.0605 0.00350 0.0652
(0.125) (0.149) (0.121) (0.109)
Cash ratio 0.461 1.272 0.411 1.363
(0.346) (0.153) (0.402) (0.122)
FCF ratio 16.28∗∗∗ 24.49∗∗∗ 16.01∗∗∗ 23.74∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Positive Accruals -0.0650 -0.236 -0.0592 -0.242
(0.648) (0.129) (0.678) (0.119)
Turnover -0.479∗∗∗ -0.103 -0.480∗∗∗ -0.126
(0.001) (0.551) (0.001) (0.465)
Reversal -0.235 1.079 -0.358 0.750
(0.705) (0.170) (0.562) (0.337)
Momentum -1.179∗∗∗ -1.655∗∗∗ -0.906∗∗∗ -1.214∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Monday -0.249 -0.122 -0.242 -0.101
(0.180) (0.569) (0.194) (0.636)
Friday -0.0854 0.310 -0.173 0.237
(0.745) (0.411) (0.508) (0.526)
January 0.246 -0.128 -0.119 -0.507∗
(0.399) (0.645) (0.684) (0.069)
Constant 1.108 0.886 0.879 0.650
(0.184) (0.474) (0.306) (0.583)
Calendar Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 26923 22262 26923 22262
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.042 0.031 0.037
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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